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1071 
LAW ENFORCEMENT WELFARE CHECKS 
AND THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING 
EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
Andrea L. Steffan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“How do you weigh a human life over a door?” Albert Datillo 
asks after local police did not enter his friend Charles Matlin’s 
apartment the first time Datillo called for a welfare check after Matlin 
had not been heard from in a few days.1 When Matlin was still not 
responding to phone calls the next day, Datillo called the police again.2 
Police returned, noticed something was pushing the curtains up against 
the sliding door so they tapped on the door and someone tapped back.3 
The officers broke in and found Matlin in dire need of medical 
attention.4 Matlin spent the next month in the hospital before 
ultimately passing away.5 Datillo wonders if the delay in receiving 
medical attention contributed to his friend’s death.6 
James Allen’s family had an entirely different experience when 
seeking a welfare check. Allen was fatally shot by police who were 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; Ed.D., Educational 
Leadership, Administration, and Policy, 2010, Pepperdine University; M.S., Administration, 2006, 
Pepperdine University; M.Ed., Education: English Curriculum and Instruction, 2002, University of 
California, Los Angeles; B.A., English Literature, 2000, University of Miami. Profound thanks to 
Professors Kevin Lapp and Laurie Levenson for their guidance, time, and expertise and to my 
fellow students in the Loyola Evening Program who are amazing and without whom I could not 
have gotten anywhere near as much from law school. 
 1. Carl Monday, These People Needed Help. Police Didn’t Enter Their Homes. Carl Monday 
Investigates Why, 19 NEWS (Feb. 5, 2018, 9:41 PM),  
http://www.cleveland19.com/story/37407639/these-people-needed-help-police-didnt-enter-their-
homes-carl-monday-investigates-why (last updated Aug. 14, 2018, 8:55 AM). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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responding to Allen’s family’s request for a welfare check after Allen 
had heart surgery.7 Police say they entered to find Allen holding a 
gun.8 Allen did not lower the gun when directed to by police and was 
shot by an officer.9 Allen’s family says he was hard of hearing.10 
Charles Matlin and James Allan are two examples of many that 
show the importance and potential consequences of police welfare 
checks. It is essential that police respond to community concerns about 
individuals, and this response is one that the public has come to 
expect.11 Police all over the country are regularly called upon to make 
welfare checks by concerned family and friends. While statistics on 
this community service are not widely available, at least one suburban 
police department made around 2,000 welfare checks in 2017,12 and 
the internet is rife with anecdotal information about police carrying 
out welfare checks.13 The exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement many local governments and police departments rely on 
to allow police to perform welfare checks is called the community 
caretaking exception. 
Community caretaking has become “a catchall for the wide range 
of responsibilities that police officers must discharge aside from their 
 
 7. Elisabeth Arriero, Gastonia Man, 74, Dead in Officer-Involved Shooting, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Feb. 8, 2015, 2:03 PM), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/latest-
news/article10422236.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2015, 4:11 PM); Steven W. Thrasher, Imagine: 
You Call the Police to Check on Your Grandfather, and They Shoot Him, THE GUARDIAN 
(Jun. 5, 2015, 11:45 AM),  
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/05/police-check-on-your-grandfather-
shoot-him; The Counted: People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN,  
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-
database#james-allen-107 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) [hereinafter Guardian Interactive]. 
 8. Arriero, supra note 7; Guardian Interactive, supra note 7. 
 9. Arriero, supra note 7; Guardian Interactive, supra note 7. 
 10. Guardian Interactive, supra note 7. 
 11. Mark Goreczny, Note, Taking Care While Doing Right by the Fourth Amendment: A 
Pragmatic Approach to the Community Caretaker Exception, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 229, 250 (2015). 
 12. Monday, supra note 1 (Euclid Police Department response). 
 13. See, e.g., Cindy Carcamo, ‘Welfare Checks’ Can Help Save Lives, THE ORANGE COUNTY 
REG. (Jun. 6, 2006, 3:00 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2006/06/06/welfare-checks-can-help-
save-lives; Rachelle Bergstein, When and How to Request a Police Wellness Check, N.Y. POST 
(Dec. 17, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/12/17/this-is-why-people-are-suddenly-
googling-wellness-checks/ (last updated Dec. 17, 2018, 2:47 PM); Rich Kinsey, Police 
Have to Make Tough Calls when Checking the Well-Being of a Citizen, THE ANN ARBOR NEWS 
(Mar. 17, 2011, 5:45 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/crime/check-the-well-being-calls/. 
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criminal enforcement activities.”14 Community caretaking functions 
include “helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious 
parents, [and] assisting and protecting citizens in need,”15 like Charles 
Matlin and James Allen. As the examples above demonstrate, 
problems can arise when police enter homes and residents are not 
expecting them, or the police encounter and seize evidence of a crime 
under the plain view doctrine. There are also sometimes dire 
consequences when people inside need assistance, and police do not 
enter.16 Today, your rights under the Fourth Amendment, and law 
enforcement’s ability to enter your home without a warrant under the 
community caretaking doctrine, depend on the jurisdiction in which 
you live. 
At first glance, restricting the community caretaking exception to 
vehicles might seem like a simple solution. However, the importance 
of community caretaking functions when circumstances do not rise to 
the level of the reasonable belief needed for the emergency aid 
doctrine17 to apply, do not diminish or disappear when an officer must 
enter a residence.18 No solution will ever eradicate the public dislike 
of warrantless entries into homes, but given the existence of other 
warrant exceptions, warrantless entries into homes are a fact of 
modern American life. In fact, most policing today happens in the 
absence of a warrant.19 
 
 14. MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 
Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
 15. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal. 1999), abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 
262 (Cal. 2019). Police are also acting as community caretakers when they engage in activities such 
as helping a motorist change a tire or shovel snow. See, e.g., New York Deputies Conducting 
Welfare Checks Also Shovel Snow for Citizens, POLICE MAG. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.police
mag.com/502719/new-york-deputies-conducting-welfare-checks-also-shovel-snow-for-citizens. 
 16. Monday, supra note 1 (reporting that police responded to reports of screaming and 
gunshots but did not enter the unlocked apartment of Heather Campbell who “was lying on her 
apartment floor, bleeding from gunshot wounds” while police stood outside minutes after the shots 
were heard. Campbell bled to death and was found twenty-four hours later by a friend). 
 17. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (holding “police may enter a home 
without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is 
seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury”); see also Michigan v. Fisher, 558 
U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (“[T]he test, as we have said, is not what [the officer] believed, but whether 
there was ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or 
persons were in danger.” (quoting Stuart, 547 U.S. at 406)). 
 18. Goreczny, supra note 11, at 251. 
 19. BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 15, 60 (2017). 
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Any workable solution must balance the government’s interest in 
protecting the public welfare and an individual’s interest in being free 
from unreasonable government intrusion. The most important aspect 
of any proposed solution is that it be one police can follow when they 
are at a residence determining whether they should enter without a 
warrant. Discretion is an “important and unavoidable” aspect of 
policing, but police need “thoughtful [and] thorough” instructions 
guiding them in how to exercise their discretion.20 As the Supreme 
Court has said, “[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police 
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and 
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific 
circumstances they confront.”21 This is crucially important in 
situations where human life may be in danger and police need to make 
quick, informed decisions about how to respond. The test proposed in 
this Note strikes the required balance and provides law enforcement 
workable guidelines for when the community caretaking exception 
allows a warrantless entry into a residence. 
After examining the body of case law in which courts have 
applied the community caretaking exception, this Note proposes a test 
for courts to use in analyzing community caretaking entries to 
homes.22 The test, modeled on the Wisconsin test,23 strikes a balance 
between society’s interest in having law enforcement act as 
community caretaker so that police never have to tell citizens who 
have asked them for help, “Sorry. We can’t help you. We need a 
warrant and can’t get one,”24 and the critically important Fourth 
Amendment right of an individual to be secure in their home. Finally, 
this Note applies the proposed test to select cases to demonstrate the 
effect this rule would have on the current caselaw. 
 
 20. Id. at 60. 
 21. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway 
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979)), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 22. This Note does not consider entries into businesses, though it discusses United States v. 
Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982) and United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994), 
both of which involve searches of warehouses, because they are the current law of their respective 
circuits. 
 23. The proposed test is modeled on the test used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. 
Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 601, 605 (Wis. 2010). 
 24. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 939 (Cal. 1999) (quoting State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054, 
1068 (Or. 1988)), abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment protects people’s right “to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures” and requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”25 The Fourth Amendment was made applicable 
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The Fourth Amendment 
does not bar all searches and seizures; it bars only unreasonable 
searches and seizures.27 Reasonableness, the touchstone28 of 
American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “depends on all of the 
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the 
search or seizure itself.”29 
Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable 
subject to a few specifically established exceptions.30 The ability of 
law enforcement to stop and frisk someone based on specific and 
articulable facts that do not rise to the level of probable cause is one 
such example.31 The community caretaking exception, in which police 
are acting as community caretakers totally divorced from their 
criminal investigation functions, is another.32 
B.  Cady v. Dombrowski33 and Community Caretaking 
In Cady, where the Supreme Court first recognized the 
community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, Chicago 
police officer Chester Dombrowski was in a single-vehicle accident 
while intoxicated.34 At the scene, officers searched Dombrowski and 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 26. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963)). 
 27. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
 28. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 29. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 
537 (1985)). 
 30. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 31. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968). 
 32. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
 33. 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
 34. Id. at 435–36, 447. 
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the interior of his vehicle for Dombrowski’s service weapon, but were 
unable to locate it.35 The officers had the disabled car towed to a 
private garage and arrested Dombrowski for driving under the 
influence.36 Unable to learn the location of the gun from Dombrowski, 
one officer went to the garage and, without a warrant, searched 
Dombrowski’s vehicle for the weapon again.37 When the officer 
opened the trunk, he found and seized several bloody items which 
were later used to convict Dombrowski of first-degree murder.38 
In creating the community caretaking exception to the warrant 
requirement, the Cady Court emphasized “[t]he ultimate standard set 
forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”39 The Court 
discussed the existent vehicle exception to the warrant requirement 
and noted that law enforcement officers frequently investigate 
disabled vehicles and accidents with no criminal liability claims and 
“engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as 
community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, 
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute.”40 The Court also highlighted that the officer’s search 
for the gun was standard procedure in the department “to protect the 
public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or 
perhaps malicious hands.”41 The Cady Court found the police concern 
for the safety of the general public to be “immediate[ly] and 
constitutionally reasonable” and held the search was reasonable.42 
No language in Cady explicitly limits community caretaking to 
actions involving vehicles.43 The Cady Court begins its discussion of 
vehicles by noting they are already given a partial exception to the 
warrant requirement because “there is a constitutional difference 
between houses and cars.”44 The Court discusses that the original 
justification for treating vehicles and homes differently was the 
 
 35. Id. at 436. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 436–37. 
 38. Id. at 434, 437. 
 39. Id. at 439. 
 40. Id. at 441. 
 41. Id. at 443. 
 42. Id. at 447–48. 
 43. Valerie Moss, Comment, The Community Caretaking Doctrine: The Necessary Expansion 
of the New Fourth Amendment Exception, 85 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 9, 16 (2017). 
 44. Cady, 413 U.S. at 439 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). 
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“vagrant and mobile nature” of vehicles, but that “warrantless searches 
of vehicles by state officers have been sustained in cases in which the 
possibilities of the vehicle’s being removed or evidence in it destroyed 
were remote, if not nonexistent.”45 
The Cady Court also stated: 
[W]hether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case and [we] pointed out, in 
particular, that searches of cars that are constantly movable 
may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable 
one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a 
home, a store, or other fixed piece of property.46 
Several courts have relied on the Cady Court’s discussion of this 
distinction to find that the community caretaking exception applies to 
vehicles only.47 Other courts have followed Cady’s language 
regarding the reasonableness of the facts and circumstances in each 
case and found that the community caretaking exception extends to 
homes.48 
 
 45. Id. at 441–42. 
 46. Id. at 440 (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967)). 
 47. See infra discussion of Section III.A; see also Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 175 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“The Court expressly distinguished automobile searches from searches of a home, 
saying that a search of a vehicle may be reasonable ‘although the result might be the opposite in a 
search of a home.’” (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 440)); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (“In short, the search was justified because the officers reasonably believed that the car 
contained a gun, [Cady, 413 U.S. at 447–48], and was constitutionally permissible in light of ‘[t]he 
Court’s previous recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling places.’” 
(quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 447)); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“Cady clearly turned on the ‘constitutional difference’ between searching a house and searching 
an automobile.” (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 439)); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (“[T]he Court in Cady emphasized that ‘[o]ne class of cases which constitutes at least a 
partial exception to this general rule is automobile searches.’” (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 439)). 
 48. See infra discussion of Sections III.A & III.D; see also United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 
1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006) (“We note at the outset that there is a difference between the standards 
that apply when an officer makes a warrantless entry when acting as a so-called community 
caretaker and when he or she makes a warrantless entry to investigate a crime. . . . A police officer 
may enter a residence without a warrant as a community caretaker where the officer has a 
reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring his or her attention.”); United States v. Rohrig, 
98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (“We conclude, therefore, that the governmental interest in 
immediately abating an ongoing nuisance by quelling loud and disruptive noise in a residential 
neighborhood is sufficiently compelling to justify warrantless intrusions under some 
circumstances.”); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 934 (Cal. 1999) (“Under the community caretaking 
exception, circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry.”), 
abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920 
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1.  Fourth Amendment Balancing Test 
The Supreme Court traditionally determines what is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment by balancing the government’s interest 
against the individual’s interest.49 The Court first stated this test in 
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco50 in 
1967 as, “[u]nfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails.”51 In Camara, the Court found that 
the Fourth Amendment applies to homes outside of the context of a 
criminal search.52 
The Court used this balancing of public and private interests again 
the following year to create the stop and frisk exception to the warrant 
requirement in Terry v. Ohio.53 In creating this exception, the Court 
stated: 
In order to assess the reasonableness of [the officer’s] 
conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary “first to 
focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly 
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected 
 
(Mich. 1993) (“The people assert that rendering aid to persons in distress is one of the community 
caretaking functions of the police. We agree. Indeed, this Court already stated that entries made to 
render aid to a person in a private dwelling were part of the community caretaking function, [City 
of Troy v. Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54, 56–57 (Mich. 1991)].”); State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 
239 (S.D. 2009) (“From our review of the caselaw and scholarship on the community caretaker 
exception, we conclude that the constitutional difference between homes and automobiles counsels 
a cautious approach when the exception is invoked to justify law enforcement intrusion into a home. 
Merely invoking a community caretaking purpose should not legitimize a search in a criminal 
investigation. Nonetheless, homes cannot be arbitrarily isolated from the community caretaking 
equation. The need to protect and preserve life or avoid serious injury cannot be limited to 
automobiles.”); State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 594 (Wis. 2010) (“We conclude that under the 
circumstances of this case, the officers’ warrantless home entry to ensure the health and safety of 
the occupants was undertaken as a bona fide community caretaker function, which was reasonably 
exercised. Accordingly, the officers lawfully seized evidence of a crime that was in plain view.”). 
 49. E.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (“Our cases show that in determining 
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 
 50. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 51. Id. at 536–37. 
 52. Id. at 530–31, 538 (finding that an administrative search is reasonable and probable cause 
exists for a warrant if the administrative standards to search are satisfied. “Having concluded that 
the area inspection is a ‘reasonable’ search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is obvious that ‘probable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable 
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect 
to a particular dwelling”). 
 53. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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interests of the private citizen,” for there is “no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 
to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or 
seizure) entails.”54 
After balancing the interests, the Court found the public interest in 
officer safety outweighed the brief nature of the individual intrusion 
and created the exception.55 
This balancing of interests has become the standard for 
determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, and the 
Court has continued to use it in creating new Fourth Amendment 
standards and exceptions. For example, the Court used the balancing 
test to create the protective sweep exception to the warrant 
requirement in which after an arrest law enforcement may sweep areas 
of a home which they reasonably believe may harbor an individual 
posing a danger.56 The Court has even used the balancing test to create 
the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.57 
In creating the community caretaking exception, the Supreme 
Court implicitly conducted this same Fourth Amendment balancing in 
Cady. The Court weighed the government’s interest in protecting the 
public from a loose weapon against Dombrowski’s reasonable 
 
 54. Id. at 20–21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–37). 
 55. Id. at 24–25, 30 (noting the intrusion was severe). 
 56. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). In creating the exception, the Buie Court 
stated:  
It goes without saying that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches 
and seizures, [Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)]. Our cases 
show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests. [United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 
(1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)]. Under this test, a search of 
the house or office is generally not reasonable without a warrant issued on probable 
cause. There are other contexts, however, where the public interest is such that 
neither a warrant nor probable cause is required. [Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20; 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 340–41 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20]. 
Id. at 331. 
 57. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (“As yet, we have not recognized any 
form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. But the balancing 
approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for 
the modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below, our evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be 
admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.”). 
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expectation of privacy in his vehicle. The Cady Court discussed how 
Dombrowski’s reasonable expectation of privacy was reduced at 
length.58 When Dombrowski’s limited interest was weighed against 
the government’s interest in conducting the search “to protect the 
public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or 
perhaps malicious hands,” the Court found the warrantless caretaking 
search was reasonable.59 
2.  Other Supreme Court Usage of “Community 
Caretaking” or “Welfare Check” 
After Cady, the Supreme Court has discussed community 
caretaking only two other times, both about inventory searches for 
vehicles.60 If the Supreme Court intended to limit community 
caretaking to vehicles, it did not do so explicitly in either case. 
a.  South Dakota v. Opperman61 
In Opperman, the defendant’s car was towed after receiving 
several parking violations.62 At the city impound lot, an officer saw 
several items of personal property including a watch on the 
dashboard.63 Pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer 
inventoried the contents of the vehicle including the unlocked glove 
compartment which contained a bag of marijuana.64 
The Opperman Court began its analysis by discussing the twofold 
distinction between homes and cars.65 First, the inherent mobility of 
automobiles creates an exigency that makes rigorous enforcement of 
the warrant requirement impossible.66 But, the Court has upheld 
warrantless searches of vehicles where there was no immediate danger 
the vehicle would be removed from the jurisdiction.67 The second 
 
 58. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440–42 (1973). 
 59. Id. at 443, 447–48. 
 60. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 
(1976). 
 61. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
 62. Id. at 365–66. 
 63. Id. at 366. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 367. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51–52 (1970) and Cooper v. California, 
386 U.S. 58, 87 (1967)). 
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difference between homes and cars is that people have a reduced 
expectation of privacy in their automobiles, as automobiles are subject 
to “pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls,” 
and the nature of automobile travel is public.68 
The Opperman Court found that the impounding and removal of 
vehicles impeding the flow of traffic or jeopardizing public safety is a 
valid community caretaking activity.69 The Court then discussed the 
numerous circumstances in which police remove and take custody of 
vehicles.70 After impounding vehicles, police departments typically 
inventory the contents of the vehicle as part of their standard 
practice.71 State courts, which frequently deal with the issue, have 
almost uniformly upheld “[t]hese caretaking procedures” concluding 
that under the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness such a 
search is constitutionally permissible.72 
The nature of a Fourth Amendment inquiry is “whether the search 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”73 and here, as in all 
Fourth Amendment cases, whether a search and seizure is reasonable 
“depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”74 The 
Opperman Court held, “in following standard police procedures, 
prevailing throughout the country and approved by the overwhelming 
majority of courts, the conduct of the police was not ‘unreasonable’ 
under the Fourth Amendment,” without expressly limiting the police 
procedures to the search of vehicles.75 
b.  Colorado v. Bertine76 
The next and final time the Supreme Court used the term 
community caretaking was in Colorado v. Bertine.77 In Bertine, the 
contents of Bertine’s vehicle were inventoried after his arrest but 
 
 68. Id. at 367–68. 
 69. Id. at 368–69 (“In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called 
‘community caretaking functions,’ [Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)], automobiles 
are frequently taken into police custody.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 369. 
 72. Id. at 369–71 (collecting cases). 
 73. Id. at 372 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)). 
 74. Id. at 375 (quoting Cooper, 386 U.S. at 59). 
 75. Id. at 376. 
 76. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
 77. See id. at 372. 
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before the tow-truck arrived to impound the vehicle.78 As part of the 
inventory, and in accordance with procedure, an officer opened a 
closed backpack and found controlled substances and paraphernalia.79 
The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the validity of police 
inventory searches but felt other precedent regarding the 
impermissibility of searches of trunks and closed containers meant 
Opperman did not apply.80 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine which line of precedent applies to an inventory search and 
if the fruits of an inventory search may be admitted as evidence.81 By 
1987, inventory searches were “a well-defined exception to the 
warrant requirement.”82 Importantly, inventory searches do not 
implicate the policies behind the warrant requirement and are not 
subject to the standard of probable cause, which is “unhelpful when 
analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative 
caretaking functions.”83 This, and the fact that the cases the Colorado 
Supreme Court relied on involved criminal searches which relied on 
the applicability of probable cause, is why the Bertine Court held the 
fruits of routine inventory searches are admissible and Opperman 
controls when the subject search is an inventory search pursuant to 
standard procedures.84 
c.  City of Escondido v. Emmons85 
The only Supreme Court case to use the term “welfare check” in 
the context of the police conducting a welfare check at a residence is 
 
 78. Id. at 368–69. 
 79. Id. at 369–70. 
 80. See id. at 370 (“The court recognized that in [Opperman], we had held inventory searches 
of automobiles to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and that in [Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 
U.S. 640 (1983)], we had held that the inventory search of personal effects of an arrestee at a police 
station was also permissible under that Amendment. The Supreme Court of Colorado felt, however, 
that our decisions in [Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)], and [United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1 (1977)], holding searches of closed trunks and suitcases to violate the Fourth 
Amendment, meant that Opperman and Lafayette did not govern this case.”). Illinois v. Lafayette 
establishes that an inventory of an arrestee’s personal effects is constitutionally permissible. 
Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648. 
 81. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369–71. 
 82. Id. at 371. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 369, 376. 
 85. 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019). 
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City of Escondido v. Emmons.86 The officers responded to a domestic 
disturbance 911 call at a residence where they had, approximately a 
month earlier, responded to a domestic disturbance 911 call, taken a 
report, and arrested the husband of the caller.87 The officers knocked 
on the door and spoke through a window with the female resident they 
had previously taken a report from and asked her to let them in “so 
that they could conduct a welfare check.”88 She did not open the door, 
but a few minutes later, Emmons exited and tried to “brush past” one 
of the officers who stopped Emmons, took him to the ground, and 
arrested him.89 Emmons sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for 
excessive force.90 The district court granted the officer qualified 
immunity and summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit reversed.91 
The Supreme Court stated the Ninth Circuit’s “formulation of the 
clearly established right was far too general” and remanded the case 
for the Ninth Circuit to conduct the analysis required to determine if 
the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.92 
While inventory searches, not home searches, were at issue in 
Opperman and Bertine, the Court identified inventory searches as a 
community caretaking function and did not limit this function to 
vehicles in any express language.93 To date, Cady, Opperman and 
 
 86. Id. at 501. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015) uses the term 
“welfare check” after a social worker attempted a welfare check on a patient in a group home and 
then completed an application to have Sheehan detained temporarily under California Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 5150 for evaluation and treatment (commonly referred to as a “psych 
hold”). Police responded, and Sheehan claims they subdued her in a manner that violated the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. At issue was whether or not the officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 502. 
 90. Id. Section 1983 allows for a civil action for the deprivation of a constitutional right. 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2012). 
 91. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 502. See infra Section III.B.3 for a discussion of the test for 
qualified immunity. 
 92. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503–04. 
 93. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987) (“The probable-cause approach is 
unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking 
functions.” (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976))); Opperman, 428 
U.S. at 369 (“When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine 
practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents. . . . These caretaking procedures 
have almost uniformly been upheld by the state courts . . . .”). Of note, the Opperman Court 
identifies the impounding of a vehicle as a community caretaking function as well. Id. at 368 (“In 
the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called ‘community caretaking 
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Bertine remain the only times the Supreme Court has discussed 
community caretaking. The lone time the Court discussed welfare 
checks, no search occurred and the welfare check was not at issue.94 
III.  CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Currently, the circuits are split regarding the applicability of the 
community caretaking exception to homes, or even beyond vehicles.95 
The circuit split has existed for over thirty years since the Sixth Circuit 
first explicitly held the community caretaking exception applied to 
homes in 1996.96 In addition to the circuit split, state courts are split 
regarding the applicability of the community caretaking exception to 
searches of the home, with some states applying the community 
caretaking exception to homes97 and others restricting community 
caretaking searches to vehicles or otherwise excluding homes.98 In the 
following sections, the current law in each circuit will be discussed. 
However, while numerous states have discussed community 
caretaking or decided cases using the community caretaking 
exception, only the ones that are frequently cited by circuit courts are 
discussed here.99 
 
functions,’ [Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)], automobiles are frequently taken 
into police custody.”). 
 94. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 501. 
 95. See supra notes 47 and 48. 
 96. See United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996); David Fox, Note, The 
Community Caretaking Exception: How the Courts Can Allow the Police to Keep Us Safe Without 
Opening the Floodgates to Abuse, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 407, 423 (2018). 
 97. E.g., Duck v. State, 518 So. 2d 857, 860 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Terry v. State, No. 6 Div. 
516, 1985 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 4825, at *3 (Crim. App. Jan. 8, 1985); People v. Davis, 497 
N.W.2d 910, 920 (Mich. 1993); State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 239 (S.D. 2009); Laney v. State, 
117 S.W.3d 854, 861–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (calling the emergency aid doctrine a subset of 
community caretaking and the appropriate factors to evaluate entry, not the Rohrig factors); State 
v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 608 (Wis. 2010). 
 98. E.g., People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262, 269 (Cal. 2019); State v. Vargas, 63 A.3d 175, 189 
(N.J. 2013) (suppressing drug evidence found when police entered a home to conduct a welfare 
check after landlord called due to resident being out of contact for two weeks because warrantless 
community caretaking searches of homes are impermissible when there is no reasonable basis to 
believe there is an emergency). 
 99. Although recent and not frequently cited, Ovieda is discussed here because it overturns 
the relevant portions of People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999), which is very frequently cited and 
discussed by other courts deciding community caretaking claims. 
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A.  Circuits Holding the Community Caretaking 
Exception Does Not Apply to Homes 
1.  The Seventh Circuit—United States v. Pichany100 
In 1982, the Seventh Circuit was the first to address the question 
of whether the community caretaking exception applies beyond 
vehicles in United States v. Pichany.101 The Pichany court held the 
community caretaking exception does not allow police to make an 
unwarranted entry into a warehouse during a non-emergent burglary 
investigation.102 Two officers were dispatched to a warehouse park to 
complete a burglary report after the business owner called to report he 
found his warehouse had been robbed.103 Upon arriving, the officers 
inadvertently went to a virtually identical warehouse near the one that 
had been robbed and knocked and called out for the individual that 
had reported the burglary.104 When no one answered, the officers 
entered the building where they lifted a canvas tarp and discovered 
two stolen tractors.105 The government asserted that because the 
officers were not investigating Pichany’s involvement in a crime and 
had entered to search for someone who had reported he had been 
robbed, the police were acting as community caretakers.106 
The Pichany court discussed inventory searches of vehicles107 
and the automobile exception and quoted Cady’s statement “there is a 
constitutional difference between houses and cars”108 before 
concluding, “the plain import from the language of the Cady decision 
is that the Supreme Court did not intend to create a broad exception to 
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to apply whenever the 
police are acting in an ‘investigative,’ rather than a ‘criminal’ 
function.”109 Additionally, the Pichany court noted that “[t]he officers 
 
 100. 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 101. Id. at 209. 
 102. Id. at 205. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 206. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 207. 
 107. Id. at 207–08 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976)) 
(discussing that none of the purposes of an in custody inventory search, “the protection of the 
owner’s property while it remains in police custody, the protection of police against claims or 
disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the police from potential danger,” apply). 
 108. Id. at 208 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)). 
 109. Id. at 208–09 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 453). 
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did not claim to have entered the defendant’s warehouse to protect 
themselves or the public from potential danger,” impliedly indicating 
the there was no public safety government interest similar to that in 
Cady.110 However, the Pichany court conducted no traditional 
balancing of interests in concluding the community caretaking 
exception applied only to vehicles. Instead, the court relied on Cady’s 
discussion of the differences between an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their home and vehicle as evidencing the 
Supreme Court’s intention to limit the community caretaking 
exception to searches of vehicles. 
2.  The Ninth Circuit—United States v. Erickson111 
The next circuit to hold the community caretaking exception does 
not extend beyond vehicles was the Ninth Circuit in 1993 in United 
States v. Erickson.112 Erickson, like Pichany, involved police 
responding to a call to investigate a burglary, but Erickson involved 
the warrantless search of a home.113 Police were dispatched to a 
suspected burglary where they spoke to neighbors who reported seeing 
two men drag a bag that appeared to be full of heavy items across the 
neighboring lawn before driving away.114 The investigating officer did 
not notice any signs of forced entry though he came upon an open 
basement window that was covered by a black plastic sheet.115 The 
officer pulled back the sheet to determine whether the residence had 
been burglarized.116 When he looked in, he saw numerous marijuana 
plants and smelled marijuana.117 He immediately ceased searching and 
applied for a search warrant.118 
The government contended the officer was acting as a community 
caretaker when he lifted the sheeting and looked into the basement 
because the search was undertaken to protect the residents rather than 
to make a criminal case against them, and such caretaking searches are 
 
 110. Id. at 207. 
 111. 991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 112. Id. at 532. 
 113. Id. at 530. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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“permissible without a warrant or probable cause as long as the officer 
acted reasonably under the circumstances.”119 Despite acknowledging 
the investigation of a reported burglary is a community caretaking 
function and legitimate government interest, the Erickson court merely 
recited the Fourth Amendment balancing test,120 then stated, 
“[a]lthough it involved a community caretaking 
function, Cady clearly turned on the ‘constitutional difference’ 
between searching a house and searching an automobile.”121 Stating 
the reasonable expectation of privacy is lower in a vehicle than in a 
home, the Erickson court agreed with Pichany that the Cady Court 
intended to confine its holding to automobiles.122 It is important to 
note that this is not the Fourth Amendment balancing test. The 
Erickson court did not weigh the government interest in investigating 
a reported burglary against the individual’s interest. Instead, the court 
concluded that because an individual’s interest in the home is greater 
than in the vehicle, the Cady Court intended to limit the exception to 
vehicles without stating such a limitation.123 
Lastly, Erickson concluded that community caretaking does not 
need to apply to homes because the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement adequately meets the government need to 
investigate reported burglaries.124 The Erickson court did not address 
community caretaking when the government interest is anything other 
than the investigation of a burglary. 
3.  The Tenth Circuit—United States v. Bute125 
A year after the Ninth Circuit decided Erickson, the Tenth Circuit 
in Bute also held that the community caretaking exception only applies 
to vehicles.126 Similar to Pichany and Erickson, the Bute court failed 
 
 119. Id. at 531. 
 120. Id. (“In determining whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, the governmental interest motivating the search must be balanced against the intrusion 
on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.” (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 
(1990))). 
 121. Id. at 532 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)). 
 122. Id. (citing United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 209 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 533. Of note, the home in question in Erickson had actually been robbed and an 
objectively reasonable person would want the police to investigate the burglary of their home. Id. 
at 530. 
 125. 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 126. Id. at 535. 
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to conduct any sort of Fourth Amendment balancing test in 
determining if the community caretaking exception applies beyond 
vehicles.127 
In Bute, one deputy was driving another deputy home when they 
noticed an open garage door in a commercial building.128 The open 
door aroused the deputy’s suspicion because he had never seen anyone 
around the building or noticed the door routinely left open; 
nevertheless, the deputy proceeded to drop off his coworker before 
returning to investigate.129 When the deputy returned to the building, 
he suspected the building had been vandalized or burglarized earlier 
and decided to enter the building to search for indications of burglary 
or vandalism despite there being no indication anyone was in the 
building and no signs of forced entry.130 Inside the building, the deputy 
noticed a very pungent odor and a wall with three doors that were 
either closed or slightly ajar.131 Behind the third door, the deputy 
found a meth lab.132 
The magistrate judge admitted the evidence, finding that the 
search was reasonable under a Fourth Amendment general 
reasonableness test.133 The Bute court stated that Supreme Court 
“precedent neither establishes nor condones application of an 
amorphous ‘reasonableness’ test to determine the constitutionality of 
a warrantless search” and that the principle of Cady is inapplicable 
here.134 Citing Pichany and Erickson, the Tenth Circuit agreed the 
community caretaking exception applies only in cases involving 
searches of automobiles and was inapplicable here.135 
 
 127. See id. at 534–35 (reviewing cases and concluding the community caretaking exception 
applies only to vehicles without conducting any balancing of interests). 
 128. Id. at 532. 
 129. Id. at 533, 539. 
 130. Id. at 533. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 534 (“Nevertheless, the magistrate judge went on to analyze the constitutionality of 
McConkey’s search under a general ‘reasonableness’ test, taking into account the totality of the 
circumstances.”); see also United States v. Bute, No. 92-CR-108 S, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8669, 
at *20–23, *38–40 (D. Utah Jan. 27, 1993) (applying the “reasonable under all the circumstances” 
test to determine that the search of a warehouse was constitutional). 
 134. Bute, 43 F.3d at 534–35; see also supra Section II.B.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
use of a balancing of interests test to determine reasonableness and create new warrant exceptions). 
 135. Bute, 43 F.3d at 535. 
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While the Bute court is correct that the Fourth Amendment does 
not authorize an “amorphous” reasonableness test to determine the 
constitutionality of a search, the Supreme Court does use a specific 
balancing of interests test to determine whether a government action 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.136 In holding that the 
community caretaking exception is limited to searches of vehicles, the 
Bute court not only failed to conduct any balancing of interests, it did 
not even identify the governmental or individual interests at stake. 
4.  The Third Circuit—Ray v. Township of Warren137 
Several years after the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits held the 
community caretaking exception applies only to searches of vehicles, 
and the Sixth and Eighth Circuits and the states of Michigan, 
California, South Dakota and Wisconsin held the community 
caretaking exception applies to homes, the Third Circuit needed to 
determine the clarity of the law regarding the applicability of the 
exception to homes in a section 1983 action.138 
Mr. and Mrs. Ray were in the midst of a contentious divorce when 
Mrs. Ray went to Mr. Ray’s to pick up their youngest daughter for 
court-ordered visitation.139 No one answered the door after repeated 
knocking, but Mrs. Ray saw a man moving about inside.140 She 
continued knocking and ringing the doorbell and, upon receiving no 
response, she called the police.141 Some of the responding officers had 
responded to domestic disturbance calls at the Rays’ before and were 
familiar with the acrimonious divorce and custody proceedings.142 The 
officers shared Mrs. Ray’s concern about the well-being of the child 
because on the previous occasions in which the police had been called 
to the residence, Mr. Ray had always turned the daughter over to his 
wife.143 In light of the circumstances, one of the officers “contacted a 
 
 136. Id. at 534–35; see also supra Section II.B.1 and supra note 56 (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s use of a balancing of interests test to determine reasonableness and create new warrant 
exceptions). 
 137. 626 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 138. Id. 176–77; see supra Section III.A; infra Section III.D; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 
2012). 
 139. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d at 171. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 172. 
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municipal court judge for guidance as to whether the officers could 
‘go in the house to look’ for the child.”144 While the content of the call 
was not clear, the officers then entered Ray’s home through an 
unlocked door and quickly looked through the home.145 Ray and the 
daughter were not home, but Ray’s father was in the house.146 
Ultimately, someone was able to contact Ray, who agreed to bring the 
daughter to the police station.147 
Ray filed a section 1983 action alleging an unconstitutional 
search of his home, and the officers claimed qualified immunity.148 
Whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity is 
subject to a two-part Saucier test: whether the conduct violated a 
constitutional or federal right and if the right at issue was “clearly 
established.”149 The court noted that the Supreme Court has held the 
Saucier analysis does not need to be conducted in sequence so the 
court could have analyzed the second factor, whether the officers acted 
in violation of clearly established law, first.150 Had they done so, the 
court’s discussion of the circuit split and lack of decision in the Third 
Circuit would have been sufficient to show the officers’ conduct did 
not violate clearly established rights and to find qualified immunity 
applied, thus obviating the need to determine if Ray’s rights were 
violated. However, the Township of Warren court first analyzed the 
presence of a violation of Ray’s rights, and in so doing, held the 
community caretaking exception does not apply to homes.151 
The Township of Warren court began its discussion by noting the 
officers were not claiming the exigent circumstances exception 
applied. The court then reviewed the facts of Cady and laid out the 
current circuit split.152 Opining that in holding the community 
caretaking exception applies to homes, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits 
did not “simply rely on the community caretaking doctrine established 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 172–73. 
 146. Id. at 173. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 174 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). For an example of a court 
that conducts the analysis in this manner, see MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 10–11, 
13–15 (1st Cir. 2014) and infra Section III.C.3. 
 150. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d at 174. 
 151. Id. at 174–77. 
 152. Id. at 174–76. 
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in Cady,” the Township of Warren court stated the Quezada and 
Rohrig courts applied a modified exigent circumstances test with a 
lower threshold for exigency when officers are acting as community 
caretakers.153 The court then went on to state it “agree[d] with the 
conclusion of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits on this issue, and 
interpret[ed] the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady as being expressly 
based on the distinction between automobiles and homes.”154 
Accordingly, the court held, “[t]he community caretaking doctrine 
cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a home.”155 
Interestingly, the Township of Warren court also failed to conduct 
any sort of Fourth Amendment balancing of interests test in reaching 
its conclusion. 
B.  Circuits Holding Community Caretaking 
Exception Applies to Homes 
1.  The Fifth Circuit—United States v. York156 
The next circuit to address the applicability of the community 
caretaking exception to homes was the first to hold it applies to 
homes.157 Eight years after Pichany, the York court found that the 
community caretaking exception applies to homes because when 
police are acting as community caretakers and the resident has reduced 
their expectation of privacy, no search occurs.158 
The York court said officers were acting as community caretakers, 
totally divorced from the investigation of a crime when they entered 
 
 153. Id. at 176 (“Those cases, however, do not simply rely on the community caretaking 
doctrine established in Cady. They instead apply what appears to be a modified exigent 
circumstances test, with perhaps a lower threshold for exigency if the officer is acting in a 
community caretaking role. For example, in Quezada, the Eighth Circuit held that the officer had 
to have a ‘reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring his or her attention’ for the 
community caretaking doctrine to apply to a warrantless search of a home. . . . And in Rohrig, the 
Sixth Circuit recognized that some situations addressed by officers within their community 
caretaking functions, though not within the scope of traditional law enforcement, can still present 
important government interests that may rise to the level of traditionally recognized ‘exigent 
circumstances.’”) (quoting first United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006), 
then United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1521–22 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also infra Sections III.B.2 
& III.B.3.a (discussing Rohrig and Quezada respectively). 
 154. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d at 177. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 895 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 157. Id. at 1030. 
 158. Id. (finding that “[n]o fourth amendment ‘search’ took place”). 
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York’s residence in response to a call from York’s houseguest, Bill.159 
Bill called police and reported that York was intoxicated and 
belligerent and threatened Bill and his children.160 Upon Bill’s request, 
the officers followed Bill and his children back inside York’s home so 
they could gather their belongings and leave.161 While standing in the 
foyer observing Bill’s packing, the officers saw a gun cabinet 
containing machine guns.162 York approached and argued with the 
officers—he was belligerent and appeared drunk—so when York 
retreated to the rear of the house, an officer followed him and saw a 
sawed off shotgun.163 The officers did not touch the guns but reported 
seeing them to obtain a search warrant.164 
The York court stated its two-step analysis for determining 
whether government activity activates the Fourth Amendment as, 
“This court first considers whether the activity intrudes upon a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such a significant way to make 
the activity a ‘search.’ Then, if we find a ‘search’ has occurred, we 
determine whether the governmental intrusion was unreasonable 
given the particular facts of the case.”165 The court then noted that 
residents may reduce their reasonable expectation of privacy through 
their activities or by making an intrusion reasonably foreseeable.166 
Here, York’s threats against someone he allowed to occupy his 
home reduced his reasonable expectation of privacy by making it 
foreseeable Bill would seek help to remove his children and 
possessions.167 Because the police were acting as community 
caretakers and had a clear view of the guns in the living room while 
they remained in the entryway, their actions were reasonable and no 
Fourth Amendment search took place.168 
 
 159. Id. at 1027–28. 
 160. Id. at 1027. 
 161. Id. at 1027–28. 
 162. Id. at 1028. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1029 (citing United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138–39 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(discussing that leaving curtains or blinds open exposes the home to the public’s scrutiny) and 
United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing efforts of landlord to 
investigate cause of leaking water were reasonably foreseeable and reduced occupant’s expectation 
of privacy)). 
 167. Id. at 1029–30. 
 168. Id. at 1030. 
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The Fifth Circuit remains the only circuit to find that a home entry 
while police are acting as community caretakers does not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.169 The other circuits that have 
held the community caretaking exception applies to home have done 
so by explicitly or implicitly balancing the governmental interest 
against that of the private citizen or by determining an emergency or 
exigent circumstance justified entry.170 
2.  The Sixth Circuit—United States v. Rohrig171 
In Rohrig, police received noise complaints regarding loud music 
coming from Rohrig’s address.172 When they arrived at the residence 
at 1:39 a.m., several neighbors came out of their homes to complain 
about the noise.173 One of the officers attempted to obtain a phone 
number to call the residence while the other knocked repeatedly on the 
front door and then tapped all of the ground floor windows.174 Finding 
the back door was open and the screen door unlocked, the officers 
entered into a kitchen announcing they were the police.175 The music 
was coming from a speaker upstairs, and was so loud the officers had 
to shout to hear each other.176 Officers could see light emerging from 
an open door and, believing the resident might be there, they entered 
and proceeded down a flight of stairs.177 In the basement, they found 
a marijuana growing operation.178 The officers ignored the plants and 
proceeded up to the second floor in search of a resident.179 They found 
a man lying on the floor of a bedroom that contained stereo 
equipment.180 One officer tried to rouse the man while the other turned 
off the stereo.181 
 
 169. See supra Sections III.A–B; infra Section III.C. 
 170. See supra Section III.B. 
 171. 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 172. Id. at 1509. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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The Rohrig court began with a lengthy discussion of the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement182 and the history of the exigent 
circumstances exception183 before framing a three-part inquiry: 
First, we must ask whether the Government has 
demonstrated a need for immediate action that would have 
been defeated if the Canton police officers had taken the time 
to secure a warrant. Next, we must identify the governmental 
interest being served by the officers’ entry into Defendant’s 
home, and ask whether that interest is sufficiently important 
to justify a warrantless entry. Finally, we must weigh this 
governmental interest against Defendant’s interest in 
maintaining the privacy of his home, and ask whether 
Defendant’s conduct somehow diminished the reasonable 
expectation of privacy he would normally enjoy.184 
To answer the first portion, whether the police faced a need for 
immediate action that would have been defeated had the police taken 
the time to obtain a warrant, the Rohrig court first noted none of the 
“traditionally recognized” exigent circumstances were applicable to 
the facts of this case.185 But “[because] the Fourth Amendment’s broad 
language of ‘reasonableness’ is flatly at odds with any claim of a fixed 
and immutable list of established exigencies” and each new exigent 
circumstance “was a product of distinct and independent analysis of 
the facts of a particular case in light of underlying Fourth Amendment 
principles,” the court is not precluded from fashioning a new 
exigency.186 After examining precedent in which warrantless entries 
were upheld when police entered to remediate breaches of the peace 
and ongoing nuisances,187 the court concluded the precedent suggested 
“a late night disturbance of the peace might well present exigent 
circumstances that would justify the [police] officers’ warrantless 
 
 182. Id. at 1511–15. 
 183. Id. at 1515–18. 
 184. Id. at 1518. 
 185. Id. at 1518–19. 
 186. Id. at 1519 (citing People v. Lanthier, 488 P.2d 625, 628 (Cal. 1971) (holding the ongoing 
nuisance of a noxious smell justified the warrantless intrusion into a student’s locker); United States 
v. Boyd, 407 F. Supp. 693, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that leaking water sufficiently threatened 
neighboring apartments to justify warrantless intrusion); State v. Dube, 655 A.2d 338, 339–40 (Me. 
1995) (also holding that leaking water sufficiently threatened neighboring apartments to justify a 
warrantless intrusion)). 
 187. Id. at 1519–20 (collecting cases). 
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entry into Defendant’s home.”188 Further, the responding officers 
“undoubtedly confronted a situation in which time was of the essence” 
and had they delayed to attempt to obtain a warrant, “it is clear that 
the aural assault emanating from Defendant’s home would have 
continued unabated for a significant period of time.”189 To the 
suggestion that the loud and disruptive noise in the middle of the night 
is not urgent enough to warrant an immediate response, the Rohrig 
court doubted the neighbors would agree with that understanding of 
reasonableness and  continued, “[f]urther, because nothing in the 
Fourth Amendment requires us to set aside our common sense, we 
decline to read that Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ and warrant 
requirements as authorizing timely governmental responses only in 
cases involving life-threatening danger.”190 
After concluding the officers did face a need for immediate 
action, the court found “the officers entered Defendant’s home in 
order to vindicate a compelling governmental interest.”191 While a 
local noise ordinance is not a significant government interest, the 
Rohrig court determined the officers were acting in a community 
caretaking function to “restore the neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of 
their homes and neighborhood,”192 and this government interest was 
“sufficiently compelling to justify warrantless intrusions under some 
circumstances.”193 
Lastly, the court found that Rohrig’s conduct “undermined his 
right to be left alone by projecting loud noises into the neighborhood 
in the wee hours of the morning.”194 The disruption was such that the 
court could not protect Rohrig’s interest in his home without 
diminishing the neighbors’ interests in their homes.195 When the 
Rohrig court conducted the Fourth Amendment balancing test 
weighing of the government’s interest in “preserving a peaceful 
 
 188. Id. at 1520. 
 189. Id. at 1521. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 1522. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 
(11) 53.4_STEFFAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  9:17 PM 
1096 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1071 
community” against Rohrig’s diminished interest in his home, the 
court found the government’s interest was more compelling.196 
After completing this analysis, the Rohrig court returned to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. While “not irrelevant to 
the governmental intrusion” here, the warrant requirement was 
“implicated to a lesser degree when police officers act in their roles as 
‘community caretakers.’”197 Since the officers “were not engaged in 
the ‘often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,’” there was 
less risk they might have made an improper decision.198 Further, it is 
untenable to insist that the officers develop probable cause despite 
their community caretaking role.199 The Rohrig court noted that the 
Supreme Court allows the issuance of administrative warrants based 
“on something less than traditional probable cause” and at times 
eliminates the need for administrative warrants altogether, in part due 
to the difference between criminal investigations and other types of 
intrusions, when substantial government interests are being served.200 
Here, “[h]aving found that an important ‘community caretaking’ 
interest motivated the officers’ entry in this case, [the court] 
conclude[d] that their failure to obtain a warrant [did] not render that 
entry unlawful.”201 
Lastly, the Rohrig court found the warrantless entry “satisfie[d] 
the standard of ‘reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment.”202 Rohrig argued the police could have taken measures 
other than entering his home, but the court “emphatically reject[ed] 
the notion that a warrantless entry is permissible only when all 
conceivable alternatives have been exhausted.”203 Further, the court, 
unable to identify any unreasonable conduct on the part of the officers, 
found the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances, and so 
held the warrantless entry did not violate the Fourth Amendment.204 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1523. 
 198. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 367–69 (1976); Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 
523, 537–38 (1967)). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 1524. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 1524–25. 
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As the Township of Warren court pointed out, the Rohrig court 
analyzed this warrantless entry as if community caretaking is a type of 
exigent circumstance.205 Interestingly, after concluding its exigent 
circumstances analysis, the Rohrig court returned its discussion to the 
warrant requirement and analogized community caretaking to an 
administrative search.206 This second discussion seems to be an 
entirely separate justification for the allowance of the entry. 
Importantly, the court did not articulate a clear test for when a 
warrantless entry is permissible when police are acting as community 
caretakers, in fact the court “wish[ed] to emphasize the fact-specific 
nature of this holding.”207 Subsequent cases involving community 
caretaking entries in the Sixth Circuit have involved similar fact-
specific inquiries into the circumstances.208 
3.  The Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit has a line of cases holding an officer may 
make a warrantless community caretaking entry: first, when they have 
a reasonable belief an emergency exists,209 and then when the 
governmental interest in the officer’s exercise of their community 
caretaking function outweighs the individual interest in being free 
from governmental interference.210 
 
 205. Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2010); see also supra discussion of 
Section III.A.4 and supra note 153 (discussing the Township of Warren decision). 
 206. Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1522. 
 207. Id. at 1525 n.11 (“We wish to emphasize the fact-specific nature of this holding. By this 
decision, we do not mean to fashion a broad ‘nuisance abatement’ exception to the general rule that 
warrantless entries into private homes are presumptively unreasonable. We simply find that, in 
some cases, it would serve no Fourth Amendment purpose to require that the police obtain a warrant 
before taking reasonable steps to abate an immediate, ongoing, and highly objectionable nuisance, 
and we conclude that this is just such a case.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 331 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding the 
noise of two people arguing is not the “type of ongoing and overbearing public disturbance that 
would give rise to the necessity for immediate action”); United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 
508 (6th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Rohrig on two grounds: the leak in Williams was speculative, 
whereas the noise in Rohrig was certain; and, there was no potential for damage to others in 
Williams, whereas the noise in Rohrig was damaging the neighbors). 
 209. United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 210. United States v. Smith, 820 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Harris, 747 
F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 
(11) 53.4_STEFFAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  9:17 PM 
1098 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1071 
a.  United States v. Quezada211 
Deputy Sheriff Ruth was delivering a civil order to an apartment 
he had been to before, in which he believed a female occupant lived 
alone.212 The door appeared closed, but it was not latched properly and 
opened when Ruth knocked.213 Through the partially open door, Ruth 
could see lights and hear a television playing, but he received no 
response when he announced his presence several times.214 Ruth 
radioed dispatch to stop radio traffic so others could hear if Ruth was 
in trouble, then, drawing his weapon, Ruth entered the apartment.215 
Upon seeing a pair of legs sticking out from a bedroom into the 
hallway, Ruth shouted and approached but received no reply.216 As he 
neared, Ruth saw the man was lying on top of a shotgun.217 Ruth 
kicked the man’s feet, but the man did not rouse until Ruth removed 
the gun.218 The man, Quezada, was charged as a felon in possession of 
a firearm.219 
The Quezada court rather succinctly walked through its analysis 
of the applicable standard for making a warrantless community 
caretaking entry stating: 
We note at the outset that there is a difference between the 
standards that apply when an officer makes a warrantless 
entry when acting as a so-called community caretaker and 
when he or she makes a warrantless entry to investigate a 
crime. Police officers, unlike other public employees, tend to 
be “jacks of all trades,” who often act in ways totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the violation of criminal law. [Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)]. These activities, 
which are undertaken to help those in danger and to protect 
property, are part of the officer’s “community caretaking 
functions.” Id. They are unrelated to the officer’s duty to 
 
 211. 448 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 212. Id. at 1006. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1007. 
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investigate and uncover criminal activity. A police officer 
may enter a residence without a warrant as a community 
caretaker where the officer has a reasonable belief that an 
emergency exists requiring his or her attention. [Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1978); United States v. 
Nord, 586 F.2d 1288, 1291 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978)].220 
The court then concluded that reasonable belief is the appropriate 
standard when determining whether an officer may enter as a 
community caretaker, and it was reasonable for Ruth to conclude 
someone was inside but unable to respond, and the entry was therefore 
reasonable.221 
b.  United States v. Harris222 
Eight years after Quezada, the Eighth Circuit assessed a 
community caretaking action not under the standard a reasonable 
belief an emergency exists, but instead, under the Terry balancing of 
interests test.223 
Greyhound Bus prohibited all firearms in their terminals, and one 
afternoon a Greyhound employee called police to report a man at a 
station, Harris, had fallen asleep with a “handgun falling out of his 
pants pocket.”224 When police responded to the station, Harris was 
lying on a bench and a handgun was sliding out of his right pocket.225 
Citing concerns that Harris might wake up and attempt to use the gun 
or that it might fall to the floor and accidentally discharge, the officers 
removed the gun from Harris’s pocket.226 The officers then woke 
Harris, handcuffed him, and upon running his name, found he had an 
outstanding warrant, so they arrested Harris.227 
 
 220. Id. Note, the substance of the court’s opinion spans only two pages: 1007 and 1008. 
 221. Id. at 1007–08 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392–93 (1978)). The Quezada 
court goes on to state, “Deputy Ruth’s entry into the apartment therefore violated the fourth 
amendment only if no reasonable officer could have believed that an emergency was at hand.” Id. 
at 1008. And the requirement that the reasonable belief be about the existence of an emergency was 
overturned in United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 222. 747 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 223. Id. at 1017–18 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
 224. Id. at 1015. 
 225. Id. at 1015–16. 
 226. Id. at 1016. 
 227. Id. 
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After first noting that the government failed to meet the Terry stop 
and frisk standard because they did not show that the officers had a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the Harris court discussed 
Terry’s relevance in recognizing that police frequently initiate 
encounters with individuals for reasons “wholly unrelated to a desire 
to prosecute for  crime.”228 Stating the rule that a search or seizure of 
a person when an officer is “acting in the officer’s noninvestigatory 
capacity is reasonable if the governmental interest in the police 
officer’s exercise of [the officer’s] community caretaking function, 
based on specific articulable facts, outweighs the individual’s interest 
in being free from arbitrary government interference,” the court 
framed the issue as determining whether the officers here were acting 
in their community caretaking capacity in order to determine the 
proper standard of review.229 The Harris court then stated it was 
satisfied the officers were acting as community caretakers and went 
on to balance the government interest in resolving this potentially 
“dangerous, or even deadly” situation against Harris’s right to be free 
from governmental intrusion.230 The government interest was not that 
officers suspected, or even knew, that Harris was carrying a firearm 
but “that the police knew that Harris was carelessly handling a firearm 
in a dangerous and public location that had forbidden firearms,” and 
the officers’ desire was not to enforce criminal statutes but to “ensure 
the safety of the public.”231 The Harris court did not explicitly state its 
weighing of Harris’s interest, but concluded the officers were entitled 
to remove the firearm from Harris’s pocket in light of the risks the 
“exposed and unguarded firearm posed.”232 Finally, concluding that 
the scope and duration of the intrusion were reasonable, the Harris 
court held the officers’ response was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.233 
 
 228. Id. at 1016–17 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 13). 
 229. Id. at 1017–18 (alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, 455 F3d. 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 230. Id. at 1018. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 1018–19. 
 233. Id. at 1019–20. 
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c.  United States v. Smith234 
Two years later, the Eighth Circuit applied the Harris balancing 
test to the warrantless community caretaking entry of a home.235 In 
Smith, the police were looking for a missing woman, Wallace, and 
believed her ex-boyfriend, Smith, was armed and holding her against 
her will.236 A “no-contact order existed between Smith and Wallace,” 
and one of the responding officers had recently responded to the same 
address when a male was discharging firearms.237 
The responding officers knocked and asked if Wallace was 
there.238 Smith told the officers he was alone and refused them entry 
without a search warrant.239 When Smith left a short time later, officers 
arrested him on an outstanding arrest warrant.240 The officers noticed 
a face through a window, so they knocked, announced, and, when no 
one answered, entered calling for Wallace.241 Wallace was in a 
bedroom with an AK-47 and stated Smith prevented her from 
leaving.242 The officers seized the weapon and Smith was convicted 
as a felon in possession of a firearm.243 
The Smith court stated the rule as, “[a] search or seizure under the 
community caretaking function is reasonable if the governmental 
interest in law enforcement’s exercise of that function, based on 
specific and articulable facts, outweighs the individual’s interest in 
freedom from government intrusion.”244 The court reviewed the facts 
and concluded there were “multiple reasons” that indicated Wallace 
might “be at Smith’s residence and held against her will or in 
danger.”245 Interestingly, after stating that it “must next weigh the 
government’s interests in the officers’ entry against Smith’s right to 
be free from government intrusion,” the Smith court then went on to 
 
 234. 820 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 235. Id. at 360. 
 236. Id. at 358 (the reporting caller told the police a no contact order existed between Wallace 
and Smith). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 359. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 360 (citing United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014)). 
 245. Id. at 361. 
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list factors substantiating the government’s interest before it cited 
Quezada and “conclude[d] that the officers reasonably believed an 
emergency situation existed that required their immediate attention in 
the form of entering Smith’s residence to search for Wallace.”246 
Lastly, the Smith court addressed the scope of the entry in addition 
to its initial validity. The officers entered for the purpose of finding 
Wallace and, as soon as she responded to their calls, they went directly 
to her and were thus within the scope of their entry.247 
C.  Circuits That Have Not Yet Held 
1.  The Eleventh Circuit—United States v. McGough248 
Recently the Eleventh Circuit mentioned the applicability of the 
community caretaking exception to dwellings in two cases, but did not 
reach a ruling in either.249 In McGough, officers responded to an 
accidental 911 call from a four-year-old girl who had been left home 
alone.250 The father and occupant, McGough, arrived home just as the 
fire department was beginning to break in to rescue the girl.251 The 
officers arrested McGough for reckless conduct and called an aunt to 
care for the girl, and while they were waiting for the aunt to arrive, 
McGough refused to consent to search of the apartment.252 One of the 
officers then noticed the girl was not wearing shoes and took her inside 
to retrieve them where the officer saw a bag of marijuana and a 
revolver in the room with the shoes.253 The McGough court assumed 
arguendo that the community caretaking exception applies to homes, 
and stated that warrants are required “unless the exigencies of the 
situation make the officers’ needs ‘so compelling that the warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable’” and, here, it was not objectively 
 
 246. Id. at 361–62 (citing United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 247. Id. at 362. 
 248. 412 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 249. See id. at 1239; United States v. Lawrence, 205 F. App’x 786, 787 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished) (not reaching a ruling on community caretaking exception because under any theory 
the court would affirm conviction under harmless error doctrine). 
 250. McGough, 412 F.3d at 1233. 
 251. Id. at 1233–34. 
 252. Id. at 1234. 
 253. Id. 
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reasonable for officers to enter to retrieve the shoes instead of waiting 
for the aunt to arrive.254 
2.  The Fourth Circuit—Hunsberger v. Wood255 
In Hunsberger, police responded to a call about suspicious 
activity.256 Upon arrival, they noticed interior lights being turned off 
when they approached and, as they walked back to their vehicle, a side 
door that had been closed being ajar.257 The officers had dispatch 
contact the owners of the numerous vehicles parked in front, and one 
of the owners arrived and said his stepdaughter was supposed to be 
spending the night at a friend’s and was not answering her cell.258 An 
officer and the stepfather knocked again and could hear something 
being knocked over inside, so they entered the home.259 The 
homeowner, who was asleep upstairs, filed a section 1983 action.260 
The Hunsberger court discussed the community caretaking doctrine 
before ultimately concluding that in this section 1983 action, where 
the officer was not following a standard procedure but responding to 
an emergency call, the exigent circumstances exception analysis was 
proper.261 
Similarly, in United States v. Taylor,262 the Fourth Circuit found 
the exigent circumstances doctrine applied when an officer was 
attempting to return a lost four-year-old, and it did not reach the 
applicability of the community caretaking exception.263 
 
 254. Id. at 1239 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)). 
 255. 570 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 256. Id. at 549–50. 
 257. Id. at 550. 
 258. Id. at 550–51. 
 259. Id. at 551. 
 260. Id. at 551–52. 
 261. Id. at 554–55. 
 262. 624 F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 263. Id. at 634 n.* (“Because we conclude that exigent circumstances rendered Officer Ratliff’s 
conduct objectively reasonable, we need not address the question of whether the entry was also 
permissible under the community caretaking doctrine. It suffices to say that the officer responded 
reasonably to an emergency, and therefore the Fourth Amendment was not violated.”). The Fourth 
Circuit also discussed the community caretaking doctrine in the unpublished case United States v. 
Marshall, 747 F. App’x 139, 142, 145–46 (4th Cir. 2018) in the context of police towing a vehicle 
after arresting the driver for disorderly conduct and learning the driver did not own the vehicle. 
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3.  The First Circuit—MacDonald v. Town of Eastham264 
In determining the applicability of qualified immunity in a section 
1983 action where officers made a warrantless entry into a residence 
while responding to a call regarding an open front door, the First 
Circuit discussed the circuit split as well as the split among several 
states before concluding the law was too muddled for reasonable 
officers to know whether officer’s conduct violated clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights.265 After finding the officers were 
protected by qualified immunity, the MacDonald court concluded by 
stating: “Let us be perfectly clear. We do not decide today whether or 
not the community caretaking exception can be applied so as to render 
constitutional a warrantless and non-consensual police entry into a 
residence.”266 
One year later, the First Circuit again did not reach a decision 
regarding the applicability of the community caretaking exception to 
homes.267 In Matalon v. Hynnes,268 an officer made a warrantless entry 
into a home while pursuing a suspect on foot.269 Noting that the 
community caretaking exception is unique because it requires courts 
to examine the function an officer is performing,270 the Matalon court 
found the officer was engaging in “a quintessential criminal 
investigation activity” so her conduct fell “far beyond the borders” of 
the community caretaking exception, and she was not entitled to 
qualified immunity.271 
4.  The Second Circuit—Harris v. O’Hare272 
In Harris v. O’Hare, officers searched the curtilage of a home and 
shot the family dog in response to an uncorroborated tip from a 
recently arrested gang member that two guns were being stored under 
the seat of a car in Harris’s backyard.273 In the subsequent section 1983 
 
 264. 745 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 265. Id. at 10–11, 13–15 (discussing relevant case law from California, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 266. Id. at 15. 
 267. See Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 635–36 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 268. 806 F.3d 627 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 269. Id. at 631–32. 
 270. Id. at 634 (quoting Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
 271. Id. at 635–36. 
 272. 770 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 273. Id. at 227–28. 
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action, the officers claimed their entry into the fenced yard was not a 
Fourth Amendment violation because the exigent circumstances 
exception applied, and they were entitled to qualified immunity.274 
The O’Hare court discussed exigent circumstances at length before 
stating plainly, “prior doctrine makes it abundantly clear that the mere 
presence of a firearm does not, on its own, create the urgency 
necessary for exigent circumstances”275 and, thus qualified immunity 
did not apply.276 The officers requested a community caretaking 
affirmative defense, but the jury was not given a community 
caretaking instruction, and the court stated in a footnote that the 
community caretaking exception would not apply given these facts.277 
D.  Selected State Cases 
1.  Michigan—People v. Davis278 
Two officers responded to a radio call that there were shots fired 
at a motel in room thirty-three or thirty-four.279 When they arrived, the 
officers went directly to the rooms without speaking to the manager.280 
The officers reached room thirty-three first and knocked and 
announced with their weapons drawn.281 Davis peeked through the 
window and saw the officers but did not open the door despite repeated 
knocking, which made the officers suspicious.282 After several 
minutes, Davis opened the door, and the officers stepped inside where 
they saw a gun and drugs.283 The police found no injured persons and 
no indication shots were fired; they did not search room thirty-four.284 
 
 274. Id. at 228–29. 
 275. Id. at 239. 
 276. Id. at 233–39. 
 277. Id. at 229–30, 239 n.10 (“Defendants’ argument that the officers could have reasonably 
believed that their conconconduct [sic] was lawful pursuant to the community caretaking doctrine 
is similarly without merit. While legal ambiguity as to the reach of a doctrine favors qualified 
immunity, Defendants point us to nothing in the community caretaking jurisprudence that might 
imply this exception to the warrant requirement would apply to facts at all analogous to the 
warrantless entry of enclosed residential property at issue here.”). 
 278. 497 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 1993). 
 279. Id. at 911. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 911–12. 
 284. Id. at 912. 
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The Davis court distinguished the emergency aid and community 
caretaking exceptions from exigent circumstances, noting when police 
act pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception they are 
“searching for evidence or perpetrators of a crime” and must have 
probable cause to search, but when police are acting as community 
caretakers they are “not engaged in crime-solving activities.”285 
Noting that “administering emergency aid” is just one of many 
community caretaking functions, the court held “when the police are 
investigating a situation in which they reasonably believe someone is 
in need of immediate aid, their actions should be governed by the 
emergency aid doctrine, regardless of whether these actions can also 
be classified as community caretaking activities.”286 
A warrantless entry for the purposes of rendering aid requires 
officers to have specific and articulable facts leading them to the 
conclusion a person within needs immediate aid, and the officers here 
did not have the requisite specific and articulable facts to justify a 
warrantless entry.287 Davis is notable because while the court 
ultimately decides using the emergency aid doctrine, it is often cited 
by courts deciding community caretaking claims.288 
2.  California—People v. Ray289; People v. Ovieda290 
In 1999, the California Supreme Court determined that the 
community caretaking exception permitted entry into homes in 
“circumstances short of a perceived emergency,”291 a position it 
reversed twenty years later.292 
 
 285. Id. at 920. 
 286. Id. at 920–21. This holding leaves open the question of whether the community caretaking 
exception applies to residences when the circumstances are not sufficiently immediate for the 
emergency aid doctrine to apply. 
 287. Id. at 921–22. 
 288. E.g., Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 634–35 (1st Cir. 2015); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 
928, 933 (Cal. 1999), abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019); State v. Deneui, 
775 N.W.2d 221, 230 (S.D. 2009); State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Wis. 2010). 
 289. 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999), abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019). 
 290. 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019). 
 291. Ray, 981 P.2d at 934 (“Under the community caretaking exception, circumstances short 
of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry, including the protection of property, as 
‘where the police reasonably believe that the premises have recently been or are being 
burglarized.’” (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 6.6(b) (3d ed. 1996))). 
 292. See Ovieda, 446 P.3d at 269 (“We begin our discussion with [Ray], where the lead opinion 
of this court recognized a nonemergency community caretaking exception permitting residential 
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In Ray, police responded to a call from a neighbor that a front 
door had been standing open all day and the interior was in 
shambles.293 When no one answered their knocks or calls, the officers 
entered “to see if anyone inside might be injured, disabled, or unable 
to obtain help” and to determine if the home had been burglarized.294 
Inside, officers found cocaine and money in plain sight.295 The officers 
left without touching anything and obtained a search warrant.296 
Citing Davis, the Ray court discussed the differences between 
exigent circumstances and community caretaking and concluded that 
the emergency aid doctrine is not a subset of exigent circumstances, 
but a subset of community caretaking.297 The Ray court then discussed 
the varied and important community caretaking functions the police 
engage in, such as checking on the “health, safety or welfare” of 
friends and loved ones.298 
After noting that the emergency aid exception did not apply, the 
Ray court concluded, “Under the community caretaking exception, 
circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a 
warrantless entry, including the protection of property, as ‘where the 
police reasonably believe that the premises have recently been or are 
being burglarized.’”299 Lastly, the court noted that officers entering a 
residence as community caretakers are limited to “achieving the 
objective which justified the entry” and may not search the premises 
for other purposes or act as community caretakers as a pretext for 
seeking evidence of a crime.300 
Twenty years later, the California Supreme Court disapproved of 
Ray and held “entry for reasons short of a perceived emergency, or 
similar exigency” fails to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.301 In Ovieda, 
when officers arrived in response to a call that Ovieda was suicidal 
 
entry. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude no such exception exists and that the Ray lead 
opinion was wrong to create one.”). 
 293. Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. 
 294. Id. at 931–32. 
 295. Id. at 932. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 933 (citing People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Mich. 1993)). 
 298. Id. at 934 (quoting State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054, 1060 n.1 (Or. 1988)). 
 299. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 6.6(b) (3d ed. 1996)). 
 300. Id. at 937. This portion of the opinion was not disapproved of by Ovieda. 
 301. People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262, 266 (Cal. 2019). 
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and had a gun, one of the two friends with Ovieda came out and told 
officers he had disarmed Ovieda and put three guns in the garage.302 
The other friend eventually led Ovieda outside where he was placed 
in handcuffs and searched, after which two officers entered the home 
with guns drawn to conduct a protective sweep and make sure no one 
was inside and in need of aid.303 Inside, the officers noticed a strong 
marijuana odor and saw marijuana growing equipment and 
ammunition.304 The officers did not take Ovieda into custody for a 
mental health evaluation, which would have allowed them to obtain a 
warrant to seize Ovieda’s firearms, but they called more officers to the 
scene and removed marijuana growing equipment, guns, and 
ammunition in large quantities.305 
The Ovieda court noted that the emergency aid doctrine “is a 
well-recognized part of the exigent circumstances exception,” and 
found the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here, given 
that no testimony demonstrated officers reasonably believed unknown 
persons or victims were in the house.306 In fact, Ovieda’s friend told 
officers the three had been the only ones in the house, and he disarmed 
Ovieda before Ovieda came outside and was restrained.307 
The Ovieda court then began its analysis of the community 
caretaking exception with a lengthy review of Ray and other California 
precedent.308 Importantly, the court noted that, other than the Ovieda 
opinion, there has been no published California case applying the 
community caretaking exception in a context other than the search of 
a vehicle since Ray.309 The court then turned its discussion to U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent and discussed Cady and Cady’s language 
regarding the difference between searches of homes and vehicles 
along with subsequent cases regarding inventory searches before 
concluding, “Cady and the other cases all involved searches of 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 267, 273 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150(a) (West 2016); CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 5260 (West 2016); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524(a)(10) (West 2020); CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 8102(a) (Deering 2016)). 
 306. Id. at 268–69, 272. 
 307. Id. at 269. 
 308. Id. at 269–73 (discussing People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal. 1999); People v. Hill, 
528 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1974); People v. Roberts, 303 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1956)). 
 309. Id. at 272. 
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vehicles in police custody. The caretaking function entailed only the 
securing of items in those vehicles.”310 In overturning Ray, the Ovieda 
court did not conduct any Fourth Amendment balancing of interests, 
but like other courts, relied on Cady’s language regarding the 
difference between homes and vehicles.311 
3.  South Dakota—State v. Deneui312 
A gas company worker was investigating reports of a leak when 
he came upon a house with a broken open gas meter and a strong 
odor.313 Suspecting the residents were stealing gas, the worker 
contacted the police.314 When police arrived, they noticed the doors 
were unlocked and “detected a faint odor of ammonia” so they 
knocked, but no one answered.315 One of the officers opened the door 
and shouted inside, causing the odor to become stronger, but again no 
one answered, so officers decided to enter to ensure no one was 
incapacitated inside.316 Inside, the officers saw evidence of a meth lab, 
but the fumes were so overwhelming the officers were unable to 
complete their search for incapacitated persons and required medical 
attention.317 
The Deneui court first determined that the exigent circumstances 
exception did not apply because officers “did not enter the house in 
furtherance of a criminal investigation,” and exigent circumstances 
exception only applies when officers are acting in their crime 
investigation capacity.318 The court then examined how other courts 
have discussed and applied several doctrines when police are not 
investigating crime: the emergency doctrine, the emergency aid 
doctrine, and the community caretaking doctrine.319 
 
 310. Id. at 273–74 (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374–76 (1987); South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–76 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. 
California, 386 U.S. 58, 60–62 (1967)). 
 311. See discussion of Pichany and Erickson decisions supra at Sections III.A.1 and III.A.2. 
 312. 775 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 2009). 
 313. Id. at 226–27. 
 314. Id. at 227. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 227–28. 
 317. Id. at 228. 
 318. Id. at 230–31 (citing United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 319. Id. at 232–41. 
 
(11) 53.4_STEFFAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  9:17 PM 
1110 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1071 
After reviewing Cady, the Deneui court noted the only previous 
community caretaking decision in the jurisdiction involved a vehicle 
and “the present case pose[d] a significant expansion of the 
community caretaker doctrine.”320 Several jurisdictions have relied on 
Cady’s discussion of the differences between vehicles and homes and 
declined to extend the community caretaking exception to homes.321 
The court then noted the jurisdictions that have extended the 
community caretaking exception to homes have applied it 
inconsistently, in ways that include creating various tests or using the 
test for the emergency aid doctrine.322 
After its review of the relevant caselaw, the Deneui court 
concluded that although “[m]erely invoking a community caretaking 
purpose” does not legitimize pretextual criminal searches, “homes 
cannot be arbitrarily isolated from the community caretaking 
equation.”323 Though the constitutional difference between vehicles 
and homes “counsels a cautious approach,” the government’s “need to 
protect and preserve life or avoid serious injury cannot be limited to 
automobiles.”324 While stating the rule as objectively reasonable under 
the totality of the circumstances, the Deneui court opined “the officer 
should be able to articulate specific facts that, taken with rational 
inferences, reasonably warrant the intrusion.”325 
When the court turned its focus to the application of the 
exception, it noted a key question in determining if the exception 
applied—whether or not “the officers would have been derelict in their 
duty had they acted otherwise,”326 before finding that given the totality 
of the circumstances “under the standard of objective reasonableness” 
the officers’ warrantless entry under the community caretaking 
exception was valid.327 
 
 320. Id. at 235–36. 
 321. Id. at 236 (collecting cases). 
 322. Id. at 236–39. 
 323. Id. at 239. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 230, 239, 244. 
 326. Id. at 239 (quoting State v. Hetzko, 283 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 327. Id. at 244. 
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4.  Wisconsin—State v. Pinkard328 
Police responded to an anonymous tip that the door to Pinkard’s 
residence was open and two people appeared to be sleeping next to 
cocaine and money.329 After no one responded to the officers’ 
knocking and announcing through the open door, the officers entered 
to make sure the occupants were not victims of a crime or injured, and 
to safeguard life and property in the residence.330 Once they had 
shaken Pinkard awake, the officers arrested him and seized the cocaine 
and marijuana that was in plain view and a gun that was under the 
mattress.331 
The Pinkard court acknowledged Cady’s statement regarding the 
constitutional difference between houses and cars, but noting that 
there was no language in Cady or Opperman that limited community 
caretaking to vehicles, concluded that Cady counsels “a cautious 
approach” when applying the community caretaking exception to 
homes.332 After a discussion of precedent, the court stated Wisconsin’s 
three-part test to determine if a search falls within the community 
caretaking exception: 
(1) whether a search or seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether the 
police were exercising a bona fide community caretaker 
function; and (3) if so, whether the public interest outweighs 
the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual such that the 
community caretaker function was reasonably exercised 
within the context of a home.333 
The third step of the test, the balancing of public and private interests, 
has a four-factor analysis: 
(1) the exigency of the situation and degree of public interest; 
 
 328. 785 N.W.2d 592 (Wis. 2010). 
 329. Id. at 594–95. 
 330. Id. at 595. 
 331. Id. The Wisconsin circuit court suppressed the gun on the grounds that the search under 
the mattress exceeded the “reasonable exercise of the officers’ community caretaker function.” Id. 
at 596. The government did not appeal the suppression. Id. 
 332. Id. at 598 (quoting Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239) (discussing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 
U.S. 433 (1973) and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). 
 333. Id. at 601. Importantly, the court also noted that the community caretaking exception 
would not apply in all instances in which officers are executing a community caretaking function. 
Id. at 598. 
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(2) the circumstances of the search including the “time, 
location, the degree of overt authority and force displayed”; 
(3) whether a vehicle was involved; and  
(4) “the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of 
alternatives to the type of intrusion actually 
accomplished.”334 
In analyzing the first two steps, the Pinkard court found a search 
occurred and, although this was a close case, given that officers can 
have “subjective law enforcement concerns”335 while engaging in 
community caretaking functions, and it was reasonable to infer that 
Pinkard or his companion may have overdosed, the officers engaged 
in a bona fide community caretaking function when they entered 
Pinkard’s residence.336 
The third step determines the reasonableness of the officers’ 
actions through balancing the government and private interests.337 In 
weighing the factors, the court first noted the substantial public 
interest in ensuring the safety and well-being of citizens and the 
considerable exigency in situations where someone may have 
overdosed on drugs or been the victim of a crime.338 Second, the court 
found the scope and circumstances of the entry reasonable.339 It was 
reasonable for the officers to enter only half a minute after announcing 
due to the infeasibility of alternatives, such as attempting to telephone 
the residence, given the urgency of a potential drug overdose.340 The 
Pinkard court found that three of the four factors in step three—all but 
factor (3), the search was of a residence, not a vehicle—weighed in 
favor of reasonable execution so the entry was valid under the 
community caretaking exception.341 
 
 334. Id. at 605 (quoting State v. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 611 (Wis. 2009)). 
 335. Id. at 604. 
 336. Id. at 603–06. 
 337. Id. at 605. 
 338. Id. at 606. 
 339. Id. at 607–08. 
 340. Id. The court also stated the principles of reasonableness demand to ask if the officers 
would have been derelict had they not entered. Id. at 608 (quoting State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 
221, 239 (S.D. 2009)). 
 341. Id. at 608. 
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IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
There are four broad possible solutions to the problem of whether 
or not, or when, police should be able to make a warrantless entry into 
a residence while acting as community caretakers. There are benefits 
and drawbacks to each, however the best solution requires balancing 
our constitutional rights with “the practical necessity of crucial 
community caretaking functions” in a test that is possible for courts to 
apply and for law enforcement officers to understand when they are 
on a scene determining whether they should enter a residence.342 
A.  Restrict the Community Caretaking Exception to Vehicles 
The first possible solution is to restrict the community caretaking 
exception to vehicles as the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits 
have done.343 One of the benefits of this solution is maintaining the 
sanctity of the home against government intrusion. However, such a 
solution would impact the cases where there is a valid government 
interest in protecting or aiding a citizen where the circumstances may 
not rise to the level of an objectively reasonable belief that an occupant 
is seriously injured or in imminent danger of serious injury.344 It is 
reasonable for the public to still expect police to act as community 
caretakers in these situations, particularly when they have called the 
police for help.345 For example, if community caretaking entry is not 
possible, the police in York would not have been able to assist Bill and 
his children re-enter the residence to gather their belongings and move 
out because the imminent threat of injury dissipated when all of the 
children exited the residence uninjured.346 
B.  Suspend Plain View During Community Caretaking Entries 
One author has suggested that the community caretaking 
exception should extend to homes, but that courts should suspend 
plain view during community caretaking entries and require officers 
to obtain a warrant based on separate probable cause before they are 
 
 342. Goreczny, supra note 11, at 246. 
 343. See supra note 47; supra discussion of Section III.A. 
 344. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 345. Goreczny, supra note 11, at 253. 
 346. See supra discussion of Section III.B.1. 
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able to seize items.347 While this might discourage pretextual entries, 
there are two major problems with this solution. 
The first is that once police believe an individual is guilty of a 
crime or crimes they will likely follow, monitor, or perhaps even 
harass, that individual until they are able to develop sufficient 
probable cause for a warrant. Not only might this be a waste of 
valuable and scant police resources, this is no better for society than 
allowing community caretaking entries under specified criteria and 
allowing for the plain view seizure of contraband or evidence. In fact, 
the resulting erosion of public trust where police enter a residence to 
assist the resident(s) and then subsequently investigate the resident(s) 
in hopes of developing probable cause for a warrant may be even more 
detrimental to community-police relations. 
The second problem is that once residents are aware law 
enforcement has seen their contraband or incriminating evidence, they 
will simply remove or destroy it. Then, even if law enforcement 
returns with a valid warrant, a search will turn up nothing and the 
contraband is still loose in society. Fox responds to this criticism by 
noting that courts could allow the evidence or contraband to be seized 
at the time of the community caretaking entry and require law 
enforcement to demonstrate separate probable cause in order to admit 
the evidence at trial.348 This, unfortunately, has the same drawbacks 
as the first flaw in this solution; once police believe an individual is 
guilty of a crime, they will be apt to follow them, or harass them, until 
they develop separate probable cause for a warrant, deterring citizens 
from calling the police for help when they need it and breaking down 
the community’s trust in police. Just as society never wants people 
who have called the police for help to fear the police cannot help 
because they need a warrant, we also do not want people to be afraid 
to call for help when they need it because they fear subsequent police 
investigation.349 
 
 347. Fox, supra note 96, at 424, 429. 
 348. Id. at 430. 
 349. People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 933 (Cal. 1999), abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 
262 (Cal. 2019); State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 603 (Wis. 2010). 
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C.  Have Fire Departments Conduct 
Welfare Checks Instead of Police 
Another potential solution is to allow warrantless community 
caretaking entries, but only when performed by fire departments 
instead of law enforcement agencies. Benefits of this solution include 
firefighters’ lack of authority to arrest or seize evidence or contraband 
in plain view and firefighters’ skill to perform medical treatment, as 
most modern firefighters are emergency medical technicians or 
paramedics so individuals who need medical attention will be treated 
promptly.350 
Potential drawbacks to this solution include firefighters’ inability 
to defend themselves if there is a crime in progress or in a situation 
with a potentially violent resident, such as in York or Township of 
Warren.351 In those cases, firefighters may have to call for police to 
accompany them while making entry which defeats the purpose of this 
solution. Additionally, sometimes police will already be present when 
it becomes clear a community caretaking entry should be made. For 
example, in Hunsberger, police were responding to a second call about 
potential vandalism when they learned a minor was missing and might 
be in the house.352 It would not make sense in those circumstances for 
police to call the fire department and wait for responders before 
making entry and ascertaining the whereabouts and safety of a minor. 
Another drawback is the same as in the suspension of plain view 
proposal. Fire department personnel may simply report what they 
witnessed in residences to police, which would provide the probable 
cause necessary for police to obtain warrants. While this might prevent 
police from expending resources following an individual in order to 
develop probable cause, the time delay would allow for the removal 
or destruction of evidence or contraband, and this would cause citizens 
not to trust the fire department. 
 
 350. Steve Prziborowski, Becoming a Firefighter: 10 Must-Do Things, FIRERESCUE1 (Mar. 14, 
2020), https://www.firerescue1.com/career-1/articles/becoming-a-firefighter-10-must-do-things-
wmOqMRqBfrm8Jflg/; see also Daniel Goldstein, 10 Things Firefighters and Paramedics Won’t 
Tell You, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 30, 2015, 11:02 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-
things-firefighters-and-paramedics-wont-tell-you-2014-08-22 (“Budget pressures are leaving 
many fire departments and paramedic fleets understaffed. In many cities, some first responders, 
especially dual-role firefighter-paramedics, have been required to do mandatory overtime as a result 
of short-staffing.”). 
 351. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 171 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. York, 895 
F.2d 1026, 1027–28 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 352. See Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 550–51 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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D.  Implement a Workable Test Based on Pinkard 
A workable test is the best solution because it is able to balance 
the interests of the government and citizens along with providing clear 
guidance to law enforcement. A clear standard will allow police to 
justify both decisions to enter and decisions not to enter in the way 
communities can understand. This has the benefit of strengthening 
community-police relations because people expect police both to 
perform community caretaking functions and not to enter their homes 
without a warrant. A clear standard will help police actions be 
consistent across communities and help engender trust that the police 
will help and will not use their community caretaking functions to run 
roughshod over citizens’ constitutional rights. 
Some authors have suggested using or modifying existing tests.353 
For example, Moss recommends a test similar to the modified Pinkard 
test proposed here.354 Moss proposes adopting the three-step Pinkard 
test without modification and without the inclusion of the factors 
Pinkard includes in step three.355 Moss’s recommendation is on the 
right track but falls short of a workable solution for two reasons. First, 
it allows for the determination of a bona fide community caretaking 
action in Pinkard step two to be subjective by failing to specify 
objective criteria for making the determination.356 Second, the non-
inclusion of the Pinkard factors as a subtest in step three leaves courts 
no formula or guidelines for balancing the interests of the public 
against those of the private citizen. This Note’s proposed modified 
Pinkard test resolves both. 
 
 353. E.g., Goreczny, supra note 11, at 250 (proposing a test modified from People v. Mitchell, 
347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976), abrogated by Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006): “(1) 
The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is . . . [a community caretaking 
situation] at hand and . . . [a] need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The 
search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3) There must be 
some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the . . . [community caretaking 
situation] with the area or place to be searched” (alteration in original)). The main problem with 
this test is the inclusion of an analysis of the officer’s subjective intent, which the Supreme Court 
has stated is irrelevant in Fourth Amendment analysis. See Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404–05; Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996). 
 354. See Moss, supra note 43, at 24. 
 355. Id. (citing to earlier Wisconsin precedent, State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411, 412 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1987), and noting the factors considered in Pinkard step three as “significant 
considerations which include” the listed factors); see also State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 601, 
605 (Wis. 2010). 
 356. See Moss, supra note 43, at 24. 
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1.  Proposed Modified Pinkard Test 
Under the proposed modified Pinkard test, in order for a 
warrantless entry to properly fall within the scope of the community 
caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, 
a court must find: 
(1) law enforcement was executing a bona fide community 
caretaking function and had an objectively reasonable belief 
based on specific and articulable facts that performing the 
function was necessary; 
(2) the public interest outweighs the intrusion upon the privacy of 
the individual such that the community caretaker function was 
reasonably exercised within the context of a home given the 
following: 
(2)(a) the degree of the public interest and the exigency of 
the situation; 
(2)(b) the attendant circumstances surrounding the search, 
including the time, location, scope, and degree of overt 
authority and force displayed; 
(2)(c) the availability, feasibility, and effectiveness of 
alternatives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished. 
This test makes four modifications to the Pinkard test. First, this 
test removes Pinkard’s first step, the determination that a search took 
place, because a warrantless law enforcement entry into a residence is 
a search.357 
Second, this test includes a requirement that law enforcement 
have an objectively reasonable belief that the performance of a 
community caretaking function is necessary. As the Supreme Court 
has stated numerous times, an officer’s subjective motivation has no 
place in Fourth Amendment analysis.358 Requiring specific and 
articulable facts in order for an action to be reasonable has the benefit 
of being a standard police are already familiar with. For example, it is 
already the standard for Terry stops and protective sweeps.359 Further, 
 
 357. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d at 602; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) 
(“[The] physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.” (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 
U.S. 297, 313 (1972))). 
 358. E.g., Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404–05; Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–14. 
 359. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (protective sweeps); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (Terry stops). This is the current requirement in the Eighth Circuit. See United 
 
(11) 53.4_STEFFAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  9:17 PM 
1118 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1071 
this requirement precludes officers from making subjective pretextual 
claims, such as that in Matalon.360 
Third, this test specifically adds the scope of the search to factor 
(2)(b). While the time, location, and show of force are important 
factors and should all be considered, the scope of the search is equally 
important.361 The scope of every search “must be ‘strictly tied to and 
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.”362 If officers exceed the scope of their community 
caretaking function, such as by opening drawers or cupboards while 
looking for incapacitated persons, their search is no longer reasonable 
and the individual’s constitutional interests will outweigh the public 
interest. 
Fourth, this test eliminates one of the step three factors: the 
involvement of a vehicle. The test applies to homes so the 
consideration of the involvement of a vehicle is unnecessary.363 
In short, the modified Pinkard test first determines that police 
were acting as community caretakers and then conducts the usual 
Fourth Amendment balancing in order to find that police actions were 
reasonable because under the circumstances the public interest 
outweighed the private interest. The primary benefits of the proposed 
test include allowing police to act as community caretakers in the way 
the public desires, standardizing community caretaking across 
jurisdictions, creating a standard police can understand and follow, 
 
States v. Smith, 820 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2016). Additionally, this requirement was discussed 
by several state courts in the community caretaking context. E.g., People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262, 
269 (Cal. 2019); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999), abrogated by People v. Ovieda, 
446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019); Wilson v. State, 975 A.2d 877, 891 (Md. 2009); People v. Davis, 497 
N.W.2d 910, 921 (Mich. 1993); State v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 235 (S.D. 2009). 
 360. See Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 631–32, 636 (1st Cir. 2015). In Matalon an officer 
chasing a suspect was not performing a bona fide community caretaking activity, as she had no 
reasonable belief community caretaking was necessary. Id. 
 361. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28–29 (“The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted 
is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all.”). 
 362. Id. at 19 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)). 
 363. The modified Pinkard test leaves in the final factor which considers the availability, 
feasibility, and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of searches performed. Though several 
courts have expressed the opinion that alternatives do not have to be exhausted for police action to 
be reasonable, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1524 (6th Cir. 1996) (“we emphatically 
reject the notion that a warrantless entry is permissible only when all conceivable alternatives have 
been exhausted”), these are factors, not elements, and the presence of viable alternatives bears 
considerably on the reasonableness of the officers’ actions and should remain a part of the 
balancing. 
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and preserving the Fourth Amendment guarantee of security in one’s 
home. 
2.  The Proposed Modified Pinkard Test and Law Enforcement 
One of the most important benefits of the modified Pinkard test 
is that it provides a standard police can follow on the scene when 
determining if making a warrantless entry while acting as community 
caretakers is reasonable. Not only are police already familiar with the 
specific and articulable facts standard,364 but police are also already 
familiar with the other factors involved in the step two determination 
that their actions were reasonable because under the circumstances the 
public interest outweighed the private one. Police regularly determine 
the exigencies of a situation and have already determined there is a 
community caretaking interest in step one. Further, police are already 
familiar with the rules regarding the timing of searches, use of force, 
and the ways in which the scope of a search is restricted.365 Lastly, 
police are already familiar with alternatives to a warrantless search and 
with methods for locating persons short of entering when possible. 
Because the modified Pinkard test provides guidelines police can 
follow—would a reasonable officer believe the community caretaking 
action is necessary? to what extent is the situation exigent? what is a 
reasonable scope for any entry? are there feasible alternatives to a 
warrantless entry?—the test is the best solution that allows police to 
act as community caretakers in the ways the public expects them to 
and protects people “without overburdening the police” as well as 
“preserv[ing] and protect[ing] the guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment.”366 
V.  APPLICATION OF PROPOSED MODIFIED PINKARD TEST 
It is important to note, the modified Pinkard test does not 
substantively change the results of many of the cases that comprise the 
current case law. In several cases, the courts performed balancing tests 
 
 364. See supra note 327. 
 365. E.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (restricting scope of protective sweeps 
to places a person could hide); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (limiting area 
police can search incident to arrest); Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (restricting scope of pat down to intrusion 
reasonably designed to discover sealed weapons). 
 366. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484 (1971). 
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and came to the same results the modified Pinkard test would.367 In 
others, even though the courts applied different logic, or relied entirely 
on the language in Cady discussing the constitutional difference 
between vehicles and homes, the police action was such that the same 
outcome results.368 
A.  Modified Pinkard Test Outcomes Chart 
The chart below compares the original holding with the likely 
outcomes of each of the cases considered in this Note under the 
modified Pinkard test. 
 
 Original Holding Result Under 
Proposed Modified 
Pinkard Test 
1982 – 7th Cir. 
(Pichany)369 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
1993 – 9th Cir. 
(Erickson) 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
1994 – 10th Cir. 
(Bute) 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
2010 – 3d Cir. 
(Township of 
Warren) 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
1990 – 5th Cir. 
(York) 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
1996 – 6th Cir. 
(Rohrig) 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
2006 – 8th Cir. 
(Quezada) 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
2016 – 8th Cir. 
(Smith) 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
 
 367. E.g., United States v. Harris, 747 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2014); Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1518; 
State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Wis. 2010). 
 368. E.g., United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 534–35 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 205 (7th Cir. 
1982); People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262, 265 (Cal. 2019). 
 369. Pichany and Bute both involve warrantless entries into warehouses, and although both fail 
step two of the modified Pinkard test, they will not be discussed further. See Bute, 43 F.3d at 531; 
Pichany, 687 F.2d at 204. 
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2005 – 11th Cir. 
(McGough) 
No Decision Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
2009 – 4th Cir. 
(Hunsberger) 
No Decision Home Entry 
Constitutional 
2014 – 1st Cir. 
(McDonald)  
No Decision  Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
2014 – 2d Cir. 
(O’Hare) 
No Decision  Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
1993 – MI (Davis) No Decision  Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
1999 – CA (Ray)  Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
2019 – CA (Ovieda) Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
Home Entry 
Unconstitutional 
2009 – SD (Deneui) Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
2010 – WI (Pinkard) Home Entry 
Constitutional 
Home Entry 
Constitutional 
B.  Relevant Case Law Analysis Using Modified Pinkard Test 
The following section explores the three cases where the 
application of the modified Pinkard test instead of the test used by the 
deciding court changes the outcome (Ray, Township of Warren, 
Hunsberger370), the case in which the outcome is the same but the 
logic is substantially different (York), and the outcomes of the cases 
where the original court did not decide on the basis of the community 
caretaking exception, but the modified Pinkard test would prohibit 
warrantless entry. 
1.  Warrantless Entry Improper Under 
the Modified Pinkard Test: Ray 
Ray is the only case considered where application of the modified 
Pinkard test in lieu of the test the court used would reverse a holding 
to find that warrantless entry under the community caretaking 
exception was barred. This is of particular importance because the 
 
 370. The Hunsberger court decided using exigent circumstances, not community caretaking, 
exception, however the case is included in the first group because under the modified Pinkard test 
entry was proper. See Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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California Supreme Court recently abrogated Ray’s finding that 
circumstances short of an emergency justify a warrantless entry.371 
In Ray, the police were undertaking a bona fide community 
caretaking activity,372 so step one of the modified Pinkard test is 
satisfied.373 However, the public interest did not outweigh the private 
interest, so the officer’s actions do not meet step two, and the entry 
was not reasonable. First, while investigating a burglary is a valid 
community caretaking interest, it is not as strong as the interest in 
protecting human life or well-being. Additionally, there was no 
apparent exigency: the neighbor who made the report stated the door 
had been standing open all day, so the actions were unreasonable 
under factor (2)(a).374 Second, the officers knocked and announced, 
waited before entering, and did not open, touch, or seize anything, 
which is reasonable.375 However, some courts may find the fact that it 
took seven-eight minutes to search an apartment for potential victims 
without opening interior doors to be an unreasonably long search.376 
Lastly, the officers had several feasible alternatives available to them, 
such as calling the residence, calling the occupants’ cell phones, and 
speaking to other neighbors to attempt to determine if occupants were 
home before making entry. Although the Ray court found the officer’s 
actions reasonable, under the modified Pinkard test, warrantless entry 
of the police as community caretakers would not be proper unless the 
police exhausted their reasonable alternatives or had more information 
that made it reasonable for them to believe an occupant was inside in 
need of aid. 
 
 371. See Ovieda, 446 P.3d at 265; People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (Cal. 1999), abrogated by 
People v. Ovieda, 446 P.3d 262 (Cal. 2019). See supra discussion of Section III.D.2. 
 372. See Erickson, 991 F.2d at 531 (discussing the investigation of a potential burglary is a 
valid community caretaking interest). 
 373. See id. (“Investigating reports of burglaries undoubtedly qualifies as one of these 
community caretaking functions.”); Ray, 981 P.2d at 931–32 (discussing police’s belief the house 
had been burglarized once they saw the mess inside). 
 374. Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. 
 375. Id. at 938. 
 376. Id. 
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2.  Warrantless Entry Proper Under Modified Pinkard Test 
a.  Ray v. Township of Warren 
In Township of Warren, the Third Circuit held that the community 
caretaking exception did not extend to homes; however, under the 
modified Pinkard test, the entry in Township of Warren was 
reasonable.377 The officers were engaged in a bona fide community 
caretaking function, ensuring the safety and well-being of a minor, and 
had specific and articulable facts demonstrating that community 
caretaking was necessary, including a prior history with Mr. Ray.378 
The government has a high degree of interest in ensuring the safety of 
minors, and it was reasonable for the officers to infer the situation was 
exigent given that Mr. Ray had previously always turned over the child 
when police responded, so the officers’ actions were reasonable under 
the factor two of the first step.379 The timing and scope of the officers’ 
search was also reasonable. The officers knocked and announced 
multiple times, circled the house to knock on all of the windows, called 
the home telephone and called and spoke with a judge before entering 
through an unlocked door and “quickly looking through” the home to 
locate the child.380 The officers also exhausted all of the feasible 
alternatives such as calling and waiting several minutes before making 
entry.381 The officers’ actions were reasonable under all three of the 
modified Pinkard step two factors, therefore the public interest in 
ensuring the safety of the minor outweighed Mr. Ray’s individual 
interest and the entry was reasonable. 
b.  Hunsberger v. Wood 
The Fourth Circuit declined to rule on the applicability of the 
community caretaking exception to homes, deciding instead that the 
entry was valid under the exigent circumstances exception.382 
However, exigent circumstances apply when officers are engaged in 
their criminal capacity, not their community caretaking capacity.383 
 
 377. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 378. Id. at 172–73. 
 379. Id. at 172. 
 380. Id. at 172–73. 
 381. Id. at 172. 
 382. Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d 546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 383. People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Mich. 1993). 
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Under the modified Pinkard test, the officer’s entry to search for the 
missing minor, NW, was reasonable. First, the officer had an 
objectively reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts 
that he needed to perform a community caretaking function by 
attempting to locate NW.384 
Second, all three balancing factors tend to indicate the officer’s 
actions were reasonable, and the public interest in ascertaining the 
location and well-being of a minor outweighed the private interest in 
being free from unreasonable government intrusion. The public has a 
strong interest in locating a missing minor and while there is always 
exigency involved when searching for minors, in this case that 
exigency was increased by the appearance of NW’s car at the 
Hunsberger’s home between the officer’s first and second response to 
the home.385 Also adding to the need for exigency was the fact that the 
officer knocked and announced and rang the doorbell numerous times 
and no one responded, though the officer could see and hear that 
someone was inside.386 While the officer made entry after midnight, 
before entering, he knocked and announced numerous times, returned 
to his vehicle, contacted dispatch and had the owners of the three 
vehicles partially blocking the road contacted, and waited.387 After 
NW’s stepfather arrived and told officers NW was missing, the officer 
knocked and announced several times again and called NW’s cell 
phone before hearing a door shut and lock and items knocked over 
inside and deciding to make entry.388 Inside, the officer announced 
himself again and then swept through the house looking for NW.389 
For the reasons discussed above, the officer exhausted all reasonable 
and feasible alternatives prior to entering the Hunsberger’s residence 
to search for NW. 
 
 384. Hunsberger, 570 F.3d at 555. 
 385. Id. at 549–50. 
 386. Id. at 550–51. 
 387. Id. at 550. 
 388. Id. at 550–51. 
 389. Id. at 551. Of note, it is evident that the officer did not open interior and closet doors 
because though he swept the basement, he did not find NW who was, in fact, hiding in the basement. 
Id. at 552. 
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3.  Warrantless Entry Proper Under Modified Pinkard Test 
but Reasoning Substantively Different: York 
The York court found that no search occurred; however, an 
unwarranted entry into a home is a search.390 However, under the 
modified Pinkard test, the warrantless community caretaking entry 
into York’s residence was reasonable. First, the officers were 
performing a bona fide community caretaking function and had 
specific and articulable facts (that Bill reported threats, and he and two 
of his children were waiting upset outside) for them to reasonably 
believe performing the function of allowing Bill and his children to 
gather their belongings so they could vacate the premises was 
necessary.391 
Second, applying the balancing factors, the government interest 
outweighed York’s private interest such that the community 
caretaking function was reasonable. There is a valid government 
interest in protecting citizens from harm when they have been 
threatened. However, factor (2)(a) leans towards the private interest 
because there is no exigency in the retrieval of belongings. The 
circumstances and scope of the search were reasonable. The officers 
entered with Bill and waited in the foyer, without touching anything, 
until York came and engaged in belligerent shouting with the officers, 
then one officer followed York into the house to ensure York did not 
harm Bill or the children.392 Lastly, the third factor also leans towards 
the government interest because there were no feasible alternatives 
that protected the interests of the potential victims. The police could 
have called York and requested he come outside but, given his 
drunken and belligerent state, his cooperation was unlikely and police 
would not have been able to get a warrant to remove York, so 
accompanying Bill and the children into the residence was the most 
reasonable and feasible action under the circumstances.393 
 
 390. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“The physical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”); United States 
v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1030 (5th Cir. 1990); State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 602 (Wis. 2010). 
 391. York, 895 F.2d at 1027–28. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. 
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4.  No Decision Cases Where Entry Is Unreasonable 
Under the Modified Pinkard Test 
McDonald, O’Hare, McGough, and Davis have several things in 
common: the emergency aid doctrine did not apply, there was a 
relatively low degree of public interest and absence of exigency (factor 
(2)(a)), and there were feasible and effective alternatives (factor 
(2)(c)) the police did not avail themselves of before making entry.394 
For example, in McGough, there was little, if any, public interest and 
no exigency in ensuring a child had shoes before her aunt arrived to 
take custody of her.395 All four of these cases fail step two of the 
modified Pinkard test because the low degree of public interest, lack 
of exigency, and availability of feasible alternatives lean so strongly 
in the favor of the private interest that the government interest did not 
outweigh the private interest and thus a warrantless community 
caretaking entry was unreasonable. Additionally, in O’Hare, there was 
arguably no bona fide community caretaking function, and the 
circumstances and scope of the search were patently unreasonable.396 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In today’s impersonal and fast paced modern society, people 
count on police to perform numerous and varied community 
caretaking functions. Because this expectation is reasonable and in 
tension with the Fourth Amendment guarantee to be secure from 
unreasonable government intrusion in our homes, a solution that 
balances those interests is needed. A legal standard, the modified 
Pinkard test, is the most practicable solution, as it provides clear 
guidelines for police that allow them to act as community caretakers 
when reasonable, especially when there may be a need to protect 
 
 394. See Harris v. O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2014); MacDonald v. Town of 
Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 10–11, 13–15 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 
1233–43, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 911–12 (Mich. 1993). Davis is 
considered a no decision case because it was decided using the emergency aid doctrine. Davis, 497 
N.W.2d at 920–22; see supra discussion of Sections III.C and III.D.1. 
 395. McGough, 412 F.3d at 1234. 
 396. O’Hare, 770 F.3d at 227–28. The officers in O’Hare did not knock or announce before 
going directly into the curtilage of a home with weapons drawn. An unverified tip there is a weapon 
does not create a public safety interest, as there may be no weapon or the weapon may be legal, nor 
does it create an exigency. The officers’ only claim was that they were performing the same 
function as the officers in Cady; however, the officers in Cady had actual knowledge a weapon 
would be left in an unguarded tow yard if not recovered. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 
436–37 (1973); see also supra discussion of Section III.C.4. 
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human life, but when the circumstances do not rise to the imminence 
required by the emergency aid doctrine, and simultaneously protects 
our Fourth Amendment guarantees. 
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